Man is given authority from God over all the lower animals; and he is empowered to take their lives, if necessary for his protection or for his sustenance. In the exercise of this right, man is entitled to conceal from the animals he would kill or capture the means employed for the purpose; as he is entitled to conceal similarly from his fellow-man, when he is authorized to kill him as an enemy, in time of war waged for God. Thus it is quite proper for a man to conceal the hook or the net from the fish, or the trap or the pitfall from the beast; but it is not proper to deceive an animal by an imitation of the cry of the animal's offspring in order to lure that animal to its destruction; and the moral sense of the human race makes this distinction.
An illustration that has been put forward, as involving a nice question in the treatment of an animal, is that of going toward a loose horse with a proffered tuft of grass in one hand, and a halter for his capture concealed behind the back in the other hand. It is right to conceal the halter, and to proffer the grass, provided they are used severally in their proper relations. If the grass be held forth as an assurance of the readiness of the man to provide for the needs of the horse, and it be given to him when he comes for it, there is no deception practiced so far; and if, when horse and man are thus on good terms, the man brings out the halter for its use in the relation of master and servitor between the two, that also is proper, and the horse would so understand it. But if the man were to refuse the grass to the horse, when the two had come together, and were to substitute for it the halter, the man would do wrong, and the horse would recognize the fact, and not be caught again in that way.
Even a writer like Professor Bowne, who is not quite sure as to the right in all phases of the lying question, sees this point in its psychological aspects to better advantage than those ethical writers who would look at the duty of truthfulness as mainly a social virtue: "Even in cases where we regard truth as in our own power," he says, "there are considerations of expediency which are by no means to be disregarded. There is first the psychological fact that inexactness of statement, exaggeration, unreality in speech, are sure to react upon the mental habit of the person himself, and upon the estimate in which his statements are held by others. In dealing with children, also, however convenient a romancing statement might momentarily be, it is unquestionable that exact truthfulness is the only way which does not lead to mischief. Even in dealing with animals, it pays in the long run to be truthful. The horse that is caught once by false pretenses will not be long in finding out the trick. The physician also who dissembles, quickly comes to lose the confidence of his patient, and has thereafter no way of getting himself believed."
The main question is not whether it is fair toward an animal for a man to lie to him, but whether it is fair toward a man's self, or toward God the maker of animals and of men, for a man to lie to an animal. A lie has no place, even theoretically, in the universe, unless it be in some sphere where God has no cognizance and man has no individuality.
* * * * *
It were useless to follow farther the ever-varying changes of the never-varying reasonings for the justification of the unjustifiable "lie of necessity" in the course of the passing centuries. It is evident that the specious arguments put forth by young Chrysostom, in defense of his inexcusable lie of love fifteen centuries ago, have neither been added to nor improved on by any subsequent apologist of lying and deception. The action of Chrysostom is declared by his biographers to be "utterly at variance with the principles of truth and honor," one which "every sound Christian conscience must condemn;" yet those modern ethical writers who find force and reasonableness in his now venerable though often-refuted fallacies, are sure that the moral sense of the race is with Chrysostom.
Every man who recognizes the binding force of intuitions of a primal law of truthfulness, and who gives weight to à priori arguments for the unchanging opposition of truth and falsehood, either admits, in his discussion of this question, that a lie is never justifiable, or he is obviously illogical and inconsistent in his processes of reasoning, and in his conclusions. Even those who deny any à priori argument for the superiority of truthfulness over falsehood, and whose philosophy rests on the experimental evidence of the good or evil of a given course, are generally inclined to condemn any departure from strict truthfulness as in its tendencies detrimental to the interests of society, aside from any question of its sinfulness. The only men who are thoroughly consistent in their arguments in favor of occasional lying, are those who start with the false premise that there is no higher law of ethics than that of such a love for one's neighbor as will make one ready to do whatever seems likely to advantage him in the present life.
Centuries of discussion have only brought out with added clearness the essential fact that a lie is eternally opposed to the truth; and that he who would be a worthy child of the Father of truth must refuse to employ, under any circumstances, modes of speech and action which belong exclusively to the "father of lies."
VII.
THE GIST OF THE MATTER.
It would seem that the one all-dividing line in the universe, which never changes or varies, is the line between the true and the false, between the truth and a lie. All other lines of distinction, such even as those which separate good from evil, light from darkness, purity from impurity, love from hate, are in a sense relative and variable lines, taking their decisive measure from this one primal and eternal dividing line.
This is the one line which goes back of our very conception of a personal God, or which is inherent in that conception. We cannot conceive of God as God, unless we conceive of him as the true God, and the God of truth. If there be any falsity in him, he is not the true God. Truth is of God's very nature. To admit in our thought that a lie is of God, is to admit that falsity is in him, or, in other words, that he is a false god.
A lie is the opposite of truth, and a being who will lie stands opposed to God, who by his very nature cannot lie. Hence he who lies takes a stand, by that very act, in opposition to God. Therefore if it be necessary at any time to lie, it is necessary to desert God and be in hostility to him so long as the necessity for lying continues.
If there be such a thing as a sin per se, a lie is that thing; as a lie is, in its very nature, in hostility to the being of God. Whatever, therefore, be the temptation to lie, it is a temptation to sin by lying. Whatever be the seeming gain to result from a lie, it is the seeming gain from a sin. Whatever be the apparent cost or loss from refusing to lie, it is the apparent cost or loss from refusing to sin.
Man, formed in the moral image of God, is so far a representative of God. If a man lies, he misrepresents and dishonors God, and must incur God's disapproval because of his course. This fact is recognized in the universal habit of appealing to God in witness of the truthfulness of a statement, when there is room for doubt as to its correctness. The feeling is general that a man who believes in God will not lie unto God under the solemnity of an oath. If, however, it were possible for God to approve a lie on the part of one of his children, then that child of God might confidently make solemn oath to the truth of his lie, appealing to God to bear witness to the lie--which in God's mind is, in this case, better than the truth. In God's sight an oath is no more sacred than a yea, yea; and every child of God speaks always as in the sight of God. Perjury is no more of an immorality than ordinary lying; nor is ordinary lying any less a sin than formal perjury.
The sin of lying consists primarily and chiefly in its inconsistency with the nature of God and with the nature of God's image in man. It is not mainly as a sin against one's neighbor, but it is as a sin against God and one's self, that a lie is ever and always a sin. If it were possible to lie without harming or offending one's neighbor, or even if it were possible to benefit one's fellow-man by a lie, no man could ever tell a lie, under any circumstances or for any purpose whatsoever, without doing harm to his own nature, and offending against God's very being. If a lie comes out of a man on any inducement or provocation, or for any purpose of good, that man is the worse for it. The lie is evil, and its coming out of the man is harmful to him. "The things which proceed out of the man are those that defile the man," said our Lord; and the experience of mankind bears witness to the correctness of this asseveration.
Yet, although the main sin and guilt and curse of a lie are ever on him who utters that lie, whatever be his motive in so doing, the evil consequences of lying are immeasurable in the community as a community; and whoever is guilty of a new lie adds to the burden of evil that weighs down society, and that tends to its disintegration and ruin. The bond of society is confidence. A lie is inconsistent with confidence; and the knowledge that a lie is, under certain circumstances, deemed proper by a man, throws doubt on all that that man says or does under any circumstances. No matter why or where the one opening for an allowable lie be made in the reservoir of public confidence, if it be made at all, the final emptying of that reservoir is merely a question of time.
To-day, as in all the days, the chief need of men, for themselves and for their fellows, is a likeness to God in the impossibility of lying; and the chief longing of the community is for such confidence of men in one another as will give them assurance that they will not lie one to another. There was never yet a lie uttered which did not bring more of harm than of good; nor will there ever be a harmless lie, while God is Truth, and Satan is the father of lies.
TOPICAL INDEX.
Abbé Sicard: cited Abbott, Benjamin V.; cited Abohab, Isaac: quotation from Abraham: his deceiving Achilles, truthfulness of Act and speech, lying in Advantages of lying, supposed Africans, truthfulness among Ahab's false prophets Ahriman, father of lies American Indians, habits of Ananias and Sapphira Anderson, Rasmus B.: cited Animals, deception of Aquinas, Thomas: cited Arabs, influence of civilization on Aristotle: cited Army prison life, incidents in Augustine: cited Aurelius, Marcus: cited
Bailey: cited Barrow, Sir John: cited Base-ball, concealment in Basil, friend of Chrysostom Basil the Great: cited Baumgarten-Crusius: cited Benjamin, Judah P.: cited Bergk, Theodor: cited Bethlehem, Samuel at Bheels, estimate of truth by Bible: principles, not rules, in first record of lie in story of man's "fall" in standard of right forbids lying Bible teachings on lying Bingham, Joseph: cited Bispham, George T.: cited Bock, Carl: cited Bowne, B.P., quotation from Boyle, F.: cited Brahmans, estimate of truth by Briggs and Salmond: cited Broom, Dr. Herbert: cited Brougham, Lord: cited Budge, E.A.: cited Bunsen, C.K.J,; cited Burton, Richard: cited, 30.
Caecinna Paetus: cited Calvin, John: cited Carlyle, Thomas: cited Cartwright, William C.: cited Chastity, lying to save Children's right to truth Choosing between duties Christ, example of Christian ethics, basis of Christian Fathers, discussion by Christians, early, discussion by Chrysostom: cited Cicero: cited Clergymen, position of Clive, Lord: cited Coleridge, S.T.: cited Concealment, justifiable Concealment, unjustifiable Confidence essential to society Contract, overpressing theory of Conway, Moncure D.: cited Court, oath in Courvoisier, trial of Crime, lying to prevent Cyprian: cited
Dabney, Dr. R.L.: cited Darius, inscription of David: his deceiving "Deans, Jeanie," story of Deception: antagonistic to nature of God among Phoenicians by Hebrew midwives by Rahab by Jacob Samuel charged with Micah charged with by Abraham by Isaac by David by Ananias and Sapphira in speech and in act concealment not necessarily purposed and resultant of lower animals in medical profession of insane in flag of truce teaching of Talmudists as to Peter and Paul charged with teaching of Jesuits of the intoxicated Elisha charged with Joshua charged with in legal profession in ministerial profession, Definitions of lie Denham: cited De Wette: cited Dick, Dr., quotation from Dorner, Dr. Isaac A.: cited Drona, story of Yudhishthira and Duns Scotus: cited Duty: of truthfulness; of disclosure, conditional; choosing of more important; of right concealment; to God not to be counted out. Dyaks; their truthfulness
Earl, G.W.: cited Early Christians, temptations of East Africans, estimate of truth by Egyptian idea of deity synonymous with truth Elisha and Syrians Enemy, duty of truthfulness to Esau, deceit practiced on Eunomius: cited Evil as a means of good Exigency, lie of (see Lie of Necessity)
False impressions, limit of responsibility for Falsehood: estimate of, in India; in Ceylon; in Persia; in Egypt; "Punic faith," synonym of; in medical profession; its use as means of good; spoken in love; in legal profession. Family troubles, concealment of Fichte: cited Firmus, Bishop: cited Flag of truce, sending of Flatt: cited Forsyth, Capt. J.: cited Fowler, Professor: cited Frankness, brutal Fridthjof and Ingeborg, story of Fürstenthal, R.J.: cited
German ideal of truth Glasfurd: cited God: killing, but not lying, a possibility with; cannot lie; his concealments from man; is truth; called to witness lie; Greeks, ancient: their estimate of truth Gregory of Nyssa: cited "Hall of two truths" Hamburger, Dr. I.: cited Hannibal: cited Harischandra, story of Harkness, Capt. Henry: cited Harless: cited Hartenstein: cited Heber, Bishop: cited Hebrew midwives Hebrew spies Hegel: cited Heralds' law Herbart: cited Hennas, Shepherd of: cited Herodotus: cited Hill Tribes of India: their estimate of truth Hindoo; estimate of truth; passion-play. Hodge, Dr. Charles; cited "Home of Song" "Home of the Lie" Hottentot, estimate of truth Hugo, Victor: cited Hunter, W.W.: cited
Ilai, Rabbi: cited Iliad, estimate of truth in Indians, American, influence of civilization on Ingeborg and Fridthjof of, story of Innocent III.: cited Insane: lying to their right to truth Inscription of Darius Intoxicated, the: their right to truth Isaac: his deceiving Isaac, Jacob, and Esau Ishmael, Rabbi: cited
Jackson, Prof. A.V.W.: cited Jacob: his deceiving his lie to Isaac Jacobi, F.H.: cited Javanese: their truthfulness Jehoshaphat and Ahab Jehuda, Rabbi: cited Jerome: cited Jesuits, teaching of Jewish Talmudists, discussions of Johnson's Cyclopaedia: cited Judith and Holofernes Justin Martyr: cited Juvenal: cited
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