CHAPTER VI. Aristotle

ARISTOTLE

In the writings of Aristotle, we find a much richer source for a history of Greek economic thought. Though no extant work of his is devoted to economics, he left a multitude of writings on diverse subjects, as a monument to his wonderful versatility and tireless industry. Of these, the Politics and the Ethics are especially fruitful in economic ideas, though, as in the case of Plato, such material is incidental to the main discussion. His general attitude toward wealth and some of its problems, we shall find to be often substantially in agreement with that of Plato. His economic vision was prejudiced by the same ethico-aristocratic spirit. Yet his practical, scientific mind caused him to deal with many economic questions more extensively, more directly, and more incisively than is true of any other Greek thinker. Caution must be observed, however, against reading into his statements more meaning than he purposed to convey. He was not the creator of the science of political economy, though his apprehension of many of the chief concepts of economics was probably clearer than has often been admitted by modern economists.

At the very threshold of economic speculation, Aristotle advanced beyond Plato and Xenophon, in that he perceived the fallacy in the confusion of household and public economy. He saw that they differed, not only in size or numbers, but in essential type. In his later discussion of wealth, however, he overlooked his distinction, and fell into the old Greek confusion.

VALUE

The extent of Aristotle’s contribution to the theory of value has been very diversely estimated. In a classic passage of the Politics, he distinguishes between the two uses of an object, the direct use for which it was produced, and the indirect as an article for exchange. This has often been heralded as an anticipation of Adam Smith’s distinctions between value in use and value in exchange. Such an interpretation, however, is hardly warranted. The entire emphasis of Aristotle in the passage is upon use rather than upon value. The exchange use is declared subordinate, and the context shows that the purport of the statement is to teach the uneconomic doctrine that exchange (μεταβλητική) is an artificial use, especially when pursued for gain.

Moreover, the passage fails to develop the definition further by distinguishing between economic utilities that involve a cost of production, and other necessities that are devoid of exchange value because of their universality. Need is recognized as an element in exchange value, but it is not differentiated from economic demand that has the means to purchase. All that can safely be said of this statement of Aristotle, therefore, is that he accidentally hit upon a basal distinction, which, had it been his purpose, he might have used as starting-point for the development of the modern theory of value.

Certain other passages from his writings reveal a clearer apprehension of the distinction. In the Rhetoric, he states the principle that exchange value is measured by rarity, though this may not be a criterion of the actual value of the commodity to life. The latter is measured by its necessity or practical utility.

A paragraph from the Nicomachaean Ethics, though it does not treat the problem directly, is also an evidence of Aristotle’s insight into the elements of economic value. It has been strangely slighted by most historians of economic thought, though its significance has been recognized by editors of the Ethics. It grows out of his discussion of fair exchange, which is a part of the larger subject of justice. He observes that a proportional equality (κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον) between diverse products must exist before exchange can take place, since the labor involved in their production is not equal. This equality he obtains through a proportion, in which the objects of exchange stand in inverse ratio to the producers. The equalization of the commodities is thus based, according to Aristotle, upon an estimate of the labor or cost of production in each case. Again, he points out that the standard by which all products are measured is need or demand (χρεία) for reciprocal services, thereby making demand a social fact dependent upon organized society. It is, in his thought, the “common denominator of value” which finally determines the actual basis on which all goods are exchanged or services rendered. Elsewhere Aristotle’s conception of value is more individualistic, like that of Xenophon and Plato, but Haney overlooks this passage in asserting that his notion of value is “purely subjective.” It is not merely “equal wants” that are considered, as he states, but equal costs as well. This demand, or common measure of value, is expressed in terms of money (νόμισμα).

It is clear then, from this passage in the Ethics, that Aristotle understood that economic value is determined by demand, as measured in money, and by labor invested or cost of production. This latter element, of course, involves the condition that the product be limited in supply, though this is not expressly stated. To be sure, the interest of the moral philosopher is also paramount here, as in the Politics passage. The thought is centered on fair exchange, as a phase of justice, rather than upon the problem of value. Nevertheless, his discussion reveals a clear insight into demand and cost of production as the two most important elements in economic value.

WEALTH

Since Aristotle had a better apprehension of the theory of value than other Greek thinkers, we may expect him also to define more clearly the concept of wealth. In the Politics, he names the following attributes of genuine (ἀληθινός) wealth (πλοῦτος): necessary to life; useful to persons associated in a household or a state; capable of accumulation (θησαυρισμός); limited in extent (οὐκ ἄπειρος). According to Mill, from the “economic” standpoint, wealth is “all useful and agreeable things” of a “material nature” possessing “exchange value”; and, to have exchange value, they must be “capable of accumulation.”

In comparing these two definitions, it should be recognized at the outset that Aristotle’s term “genuine” does not mean “truly economic,” as it might in Mill, but rather “legitimate wealth” as distinguished from that gained from false finance (χρηματιστική); also that his “necessary to life” and “limited in extent” are not used in the economic but in the moral sense, as opposed to luxury and extreme interest in money-making. Mill’s “all useful and agreeable things” presents a marked contrast to this in spirit. Aristotle’s “useful” means “what subserves the final good” (πρὸς ἀγαθὴν ζωήν), while Mill’s means “things that give sensations of comfort or pleasure.” Thus Aristotle’s wealth is necessarily limited, while Mill’s is unlimited, since, as Barker observes, “only an infinity of wealth can satisfy an infinity of need.” It will be seen from the following discussion, however, that Aristotle includes more than “necessary things” in his category of economic wealth. He does not specify “material things,” as does Mill, but it seems probable that this is his meaning. In all the passages where he enumerates the different kinds of wealth, only material things are included, except slaves, who are counted as mere tools. One of these passages specifically excludes intellectual wealth by defining property as a “separable instrument.” The use of the term for value (ἀξία) probably implies the same limitation. Though Aristotle does not mention exchange value specifically, it is clearly implied in his definition. “Things useful for the association of a state” and things “capable of accumulation” must have exchange value, thus excluding illimitable utilities such as air and light. His use of κτῆμα, “possession,” and his recognition of cost of production and economic demand as the main factors in determining value, are further evidence of this. Moreover, as seen above, in the Ethics, he clearly makes exchange value an attribute of all wealth.

From our comparison of the two definitions, then, it is evident that, though Aristotle is antithetical to Mill in putting the ethical interest first, and though his definition is not so scientifically specific, yet the two agree in recognizing the qualities of materiality, exchange value, and possibility of accumulation as necessary attributes of wealth. We shall see below, also, that the Greek philosopher was the forerunner of the orthodox English economists in criticizing the common confusion of money with wealth.

But, despite his grasp of the leading principles in the economics of wealth, he takes the same negative moral attitude toward wealth as does Plato, though his hostility is also directed primarily against the spirit that commercializes life and makes unlimited wealth the summum bonum. To his mind, this idea that wealth is the sum of all goods is almost the necessary accompaniment of the possession of superfluous wealth, but it is especially characteristic of the new-rich (νεωστὶ κεκτημένοις). Yet Aristotle is too practical to be ascetic. He realizes that leisure (σχολή) is necessary for moral development and for good citizenship, and that this cannot be enjoyed except on a basis of sufficient wealth. A fair competency is therefore desirable for the best life, for men should live not only temperately, but liberally. Poverty produces civic strife and crime. Wealth in the absolute sense (ἁπλῶς) is always good, though it may not always be fitted to a certain individual, or be property used by him. Each, therefore, should choose what is good for himself, and use it accordingly. All this sounds saner than the subjective notion of wealth taught by Plato. But right here is the secret of the difficulty as Aristotle sees it. Just because all external wealth is good in the absolute sense, the popular error has arisen that it is the final cause (αἰτία) of all happiness, whereas the actual relation of wealth to happiness is the same as that of the lyre to the tune. There can be no music without the intervention of the musician. External goods are therefore not of primary importance to life. The goods of the soul should be placed first, for the virtues of life are not gained and preserved by material wealth, but vice versa, and the men of high character and intelligence are most happy, even though their wealth is moderate. The common attitude of the money-maker that wealth is unlimited is contrary to nature. Genuine wealth cannot be unlimited, since external goods are strictly defined by their utility for a certain thing. Excessive wealth thus either harms the owner, or is, at least, useless to him. Neither can wealth be rightly made the summum bonum, for it is really not an end at all, but only a collection of means to an end (ὀργάνων πλῆθος). The inevitable result of making it the end and measure of all is moral degeneration. If the highest interests of life are to be preserved, it must always be kept subservient. First things must be placed first, both by the individual and by the state.

PRODUCTION

It is often asserted that Aristotle denied the very existence of a problem of production. This statement has been based primarily on certain passages in the Politics. These passages, however, are not a denial of the importance of production. Their purport is merely to show that the chief aim of life is not to produce or to provide wealth, but to use it for the advancement of life’s highest interest. From this standpoint, both acquisition (κτητική) and production (ποιητική) are subordinate arts. So far is Aristotle from giving no place to production, that a later chapter of the Politics is devoted to the consideration of the scheme of supply, including production. To be sure, he does not lay much emphasis on genuine production in his enumeration. Industry is barely mentioned, while agriculture is discussed in detail. His “free-holder” is a consumer of the gifts of nature, rather than a real producer. He classifies the truly productive employments that work for themselves (αὐτόφυτον) as those of the nomad, the farmer, the brigand, the fisherman, and the hunter, and makes those that live by barter (ἁλλαγῆς) or trade (καπηλείας) parasitic.

In another passage, finance, strictly defined (οἰκειατάτη), is limited to all forms of agriculture, and even the hired labor (μισθαρνία) of industry is included in unnatural finance. Aristotle has thus often been compared to the physiocrats, who distinguished between creative and parasitic classes of workers, upheld the “natural” order as the ideal, and eulogized agriculture and the “extractive” industries as the only productive ones. As Souchon has observed, however, the resemblance is only superficial. Yet the fact that he fails to see that exchange is productive of a time and place value, and the fact that he includes hired labor, skilled and unskilled, among the unnatural activities, are sufficient evidence that he had only a superficial grasp of the principles of production. But the frequent assertion that he includes brigandage and war among the productive arts is unwarranted, for he classifies them only among the acquisitive means.

Aristotle almost outdoes Plato in his subordination of all production to ethics, though he keeps their respective aims more distinct. According to him, the productive arts are not ends in themselves. They are means to the supreme end of the moral life, whose first interest is not in production, but in right action. As seen in our discussion of Plato, such a doctrine is not fruitful, economically. If interpreted too rigidly, it stifles commerce and industry. Yet, at bottom, it holds a great truth which modern economists are emphasizing—the fact that wealth and production alike must be subordinated to the general individual and social good. Moreover, the philosopher should not be interpreted in too hard-and-fast a manner. Barker is extreme in his statement that the economic theory of Aristotle is a mere treatise on “the ethics of family life” and that “the fundamental characteristic of his idea of production is a reactionary archaism, which abolishes all the machinery of civilization in favor of the self-supporting farm and a modicum of barter.” Bonar’s assertion is also unwarranted, that “Aristotle thinks it beneath the dignity” of his discourse to give the practical details of agriculture and industry “more than a cursory notice.” Such details were not germane to the plan of his work, and would certainly be considered out of place in a modern general text on economics. Aristotle’s economic doctrine, as a whole, is certainly far broader in scope than the family, and, while based upon ethics, is something more than an ethical treatise. As seen above, he recognizes the necessity of a moderate acquisition of wealth, both for the prosperous state and for the virtuous man, and demands only that the human interest be put first.

Agriculture.—Of the factors that enter into production, Aristotle is, like the other Socratics, most interested in natural resources. He emphasizes especially the agricultural life. To his mind, it is the only true foundation of “natural finance,” since the financial means should be provided in nature herself. Natural finance (οἰκειατάτη) is made to include only a proper knowledge of the care of land, cattle, bees, fowl, and other natural resources. It is natural, since it does not earn at the expense of others, as do retail trade and other methods of false finance. Aristotle also reveals his interest in agriculture by giving a bibliography of the subject. He names Charetides of Paros, Apollodorus of Lemnos, “and others on other branches”—a hint that many such works on practical economics may be lost to us. However, his interest, even in this primary industry, is not of a practical nature, like that of Xenophon. He relegates it to the non-citizen classes, along with commerce and the mechanical arts.

Capital.—Aristotle is the only Greek thinker who has given a clear definition of capital. After defining the slave as an instrument (ὅργανον), in order to distinguish still more sharply, he differentiates between the two kinds of wealth—that which is used for consumption, and that which is employed for further production. As an example of the former, he uses the bed and the dress, and of the latter the weaver’s comb (κερκίς). He points out that all wealth is produced for consumption, but that part of it is consumed indirectly in manufacture. Here is an approach to Adam Smith’s definition of capital, as “that part of a man’s stock which he expects to afford him revenue.” Unfortunately, however, the Greek fails to pursue his distinction farther. The theme of his thought is, after all, not capital or production either, but the status of the slave, though, from his standpoint, the slave is capital. He proceeds with the very uneconomic assertion that life consists in action (πρᾶξις), not in production (ποίησις), and concludes with the real goal of his argument, that the slave is an assistant (ὑπερέτης), or an animate instrument in the realm of action, not of production. The slave is therefore an instrument to increase the life or action of his master, who himself is not represented as a producer, but as a consumer of the present stock. Thus what bids fair to be a fruitful distinction ends in a denial of the primary importance of production. The purpose of Aristotle is here similar to that in some passages of Ruskin and Adam Smith, to emphasize consumption rather than production.

In another passage, he repeats his definition of capital in different terms. Goods are classified as for “purposes of production” or for “mere enjoyment,” but here again no theory of capital is developed. Yet these two definitions are sufficient evidence that he advanced beyond his predecessors in his apprehension of the meaning of the term. His division of production and finance, however, into the natural or limited, which deals only with natural resources, and the unnatural, which is unlimited, and includes commerce, usury, and even industry, reveals a mind neither greatly interested in capital, nor clear as to its true economic importance. His assertion in the Ethics that the prodigal (ἄσωτος) benefits many by his reckless expenditures, and that parsimoniousness (ἀνελευθερία) is a worse evil than prodigality also shows that he did not sufficiently emphasize the importance to society of economy, the mother of stored capital. On this point, Plato has the saner view, and the extreme attitude of Aristotle is certainly not characteristic of the Greeks in general. His failure to grasp the true theory of interest is a further evidence of his superficial apprehension of the function of money capital. He does not see, with Adam Smith, that money represents so much stored capital, potentially productive, and that “since something can everywhere be made by the use of money, something ought everywhere to be paid for the use of it.” In justice to him, however, it should be observed that, though he failed to see the importance of unlimited economic progress through constant increase in the capitalistic stock, there is after all a sense in which he was right. There is a natural limit to just acquisition, and it is especially with the individual in relation to wealth that he is dealing. He is thus, with Plato, a forerunner of the present tendency in economics, which is inclined to set a limit to the amount that one can justly earn in a lifetime by his own work.

Labor and industry.—Aristotle’s attitude to labor, the third factor in production, is similar to that of Plato, though he lays greater emphasis on the evil physical and moral effect of the “banausic” arts. They are defined as those that “render men unfit for the practice of virtue.” They not only cause the body to degenerate, but, being “mercenary” employments, they also vulgarize the soul. The occupations that require the most physical labor are the most “slavish.” The life of artisans and laborers is mean (φαῦλος) and has no business with virtue. The citizen youth should be taught none of the illiberal pursuits of the tradesmen. No citizen should enter into industrial labor or retail trade, since they are ignoble (ἀγεννής) and hostile to virtue. Even all the agricultural work must be performed by slaves, that the citizens may have leisure for personal development and for service to the state. In addition to his other objections to retail trade and the arts, Aristotle considers them to be naturally unjust, since they take something from him with whom they deal. Indeed, the productive classes have but slight recognition in his ideal state. They seem to be tolerated only as a necessary evil, and are in a state of limited slavery ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ δουλείαν. Virtue is even less possible for them than for slaves, and they lead a less tolerable life. All hired labor belongs to the category of “false finance” which degrades individual and state alike. The state that produces a multitude of mechanics and but few hoplites can never be great.

Here we have the very antithesis of the modern commercial standpoint. However, the truth is not all with the moderns, for a highly developed commerce and industry and the general prosperity of the mass of the people are not always necessarily coincident. Moreover, it is hardly fair to interpret Aristotle too rigidly. He understood well the necessity of craftsmen and all other industrial workers to the state. The burden of his attack was directed against retail trade. Like Plato’s his prejudice had a moral and political root, and was arrayed against the extreme application to labor, and against its false purpose, rather than against labor itself. He insisted that even intellectual work, when carried to an extreme, and pursued with the wrong aim, might become equally demoralizing.

Here is a doctrine which our modern age, that would place even education on a bread-and-butter basis, and that tends to kill initiative and vision by extreme specialization, might well consider. Even Latin literature, when taught as it too often is, merely as a syntactical grind to prepare teachers to pursue the same folly is no more one of the humanities than is industrial chemistry. Furthermore, Aristotle and Plato are doubtless right in their belief that a necessary extreme application to physical labor to earn the daily bread inevitably prevents mental and moral development and the proper performance of the duties of citizenship. And our modern democracies with their boasts of universal suffrage are still something of a farce, as long as economic conditions are such that the mass of the population has left no time to think of anything, except how to provide the bare physical necessities. Aristotle’s insistence upon leisure for the life of the citizen is no demand for aristocratic indolence. Neither is it Jowett’s “condition of a gentleman,” or merely the idealized notion of an “internal state” in which “the intellect, free from the cares of practical life, energizes or reposes in the consciousness of truth.” It is rather a demand for release from material cares, so as to insure the highest degree of activity in self-development and political service.

It may well be observed too, that Aristotle, the special champion of slavery, and reputed scorner of physical labor for freemen, exhibits a real interest in industry, in unguarded moments. One of his arguments against communism is that it would take from the citizen the desire to work. He repudiates the life of indolence, and finds happiness in action. He considers a practical knowledge of agriculture as essential to the successful economist, and defines the just as those who live upon their own resources or labor, instead of making profit from others, especially the farmers, who live from the land which they cultivate. We have seen above also that he makes labor one of the prime factors that determine value, and thus the most important element in production. Moreover, he shows that he has a practical grasp of the importance of productive employment for the citizens of a democracy. He advises the rich to furnish plots of land (γήδια) to the poor, from the public revenues, or else that they give the poor a start (ἀφορμή) in other business, and thus turn them to industry.

On the division of labor, Aristotle adds little to Plato’s and Xenophon’s theory. He agrees with Xenophon against Plato that it implies a necessary distinction between the work of men and women. He also applies the principle more extensively, so as to include all nature, whereas Plato seems to limit its application to man. Nature (ἡ φύσις) he observes, does not produce things like the Delphian knife, in a poverty-stricken manner (πενιχρῶς) to serve many purposes, but each for a single purpose (ἓν πρὸς ἓν). Like Plato, he makes the principle of reciprocity (τὸ ἴσον ἀντιπεπονθός) out of which the division of labor arises, the saving element in the state. He is also fully as emphatic in his application of the law to politics and citizenship.

SLAVERY

We have seen that the references to slavery in Xenophon and Plato are incidental, and reveal a certain unconscious naïveté as to the actual social problem involved. By Aristotle’s day, however, the criticisms of the Sophists had shaken the foundations of all traditional institutions, and their thesis that slavery is contrary to nature had become through the Cynics a prominent social theory. The thought on the subject had crystallized into two leading doctrines—one including benevolence in justice, and hence denying the right of slavery; and the other identifying justice with the rule of the stronger, and hence upholding slavery as based on mere force. The practical Aristotle, an upholder of slavery, not from tradition, but through conscious belief in its economic necessity, thus takes his stand midway between the two opposing theories. He champions the old view of natural slavery, but rejects the basis of mere force for that of morality and benevolence. His thesis is that slavery is a natural and necessary relation in human society, not accidental or conventional. The slave, being property, which is a multitude of instruments (ὀργάνων πλῆθος), is an animate instrument (ὄργανον ἔμψυχον) conducive to life (πρὸς ζωήν). He is just as necessary to the best life of the citizen as are inanimate instruments, and will be, until all tools work automatically, like the mythical figures of Daedalus or the tripods of Hephaestus. The slave is a servant in the realm of action (πρᾶξις), not of production (ποίησις). He is not a producer of commodities (ποιητικός), but of services (πρακτικός), and just as property is merely a part or member (μόριον) belonging wholly to something else, so the slave, as property, belongs entirely to his master, and has no true existence apart from him. From these facts, the whole nature and power of the slave are evident. One who, though a human being, is merely property is a natural slave, since he is naturally not his own master, but belongs to another, in whom he finds his true being. As Barker has observed, this conclusion of the first part of Aristotle’s argument is inevitable if we admit his premises of the identity of “instruments” and property, but this is an unreal identity. “Natural” (φύσει) is the saving word in his argument, but “human” (ἄνθρωπος) refutes it, as the philosopher practically admits later.

He now proceeds to ask the question whether this “natural” slave of his hypothesis actually exists, for whom such a relation is just, or whether all slavery is contrary to nature, as some allege. He answers in the affirmative. The principle of rule and subjection he declares to be a foundation law of all life. Men are constituted for either condition from birth, and their development follows this natural bent. This law may be observed in inanimate things, in the natural subordinate relation of the body to the soul, of domestic animals to man, of female to male, of child to parent, and of subjects to rulers. Thus all who are capable only of physical service hold the same relation to higher natures as the body holds to the soul, and are slaves by nature. This is the only relation for which the slave is naturally fitted, since he can apprehend reason without himself possessing it, being midway between animals and truly rational men. Usually also nature differentiates both the bodies and the souls of freemen and slaves, suiting them to their respective spheres and functions.

This relation of slavery, Aristotle argues, is not only natural and necessary, but also beneficial for those who are so constituted. Just as the body is benefited by the rule of the soul, and domestic animals by the rule of man, so it is distinctly to the advantage of the “natural slave” to be ruled by a rational master. This is universally true, wherever one class of persons is as inferior to another as is the body to the soul.

The philosopher’s frank admissions, in which he opposes the doctrine that slavery is founded on mere force, are fatal to his first argument on the natural slave. He admits that nature does not always consummate her purpose; that the souls of freemen are sometimes found in the bodies of slaves, and vice versa; that it is difficult to distinguish the quality of the soul, in any event; that the claim that slavery is neither natural nor beneficial has in it a modicum of truth, as there are sometimes merely legal slaves, or slaves by convention; that slavery based on mere might without virtue is unjust; that captives of war may be wrongly enslaved; that only those who actually deserve it, should meet this fate; that the accidents of life may bring even the noblest of mankind into slavery; and that only non-Greeks are ignoble and worthy of it. He even insists that the terms “slave-master,” “freeman,” “slave,” when rightly used, imply a certain virtue or the lack of it, and therefore that to be justly a master, one must be morally superior. The question of the possession of the higher virtues by slaves is recognized by him to be a difficult problem, for an affirmative answer breaks down his distinction of “natural” slave, yet it seems paradoxical to deny these virtues to him as a human being. Nor can the difficulty be avoided by positing for the slave a mere difference in degree of virtue, for the distinction between ruler and subject must be one of kind. In any event, temperance and justice are necessary even for good slave service. Aristotle therefore evades the difficulty, and begs the question by concluding that both master and slave must share in virtue, but differently, in accord with their respective stations.

With this admission, he places slaves on a higher plane than free artisans, in that he denies virtue to such classes, since it cannot be produced in them, except as they are brought into contact with a master. He thus makes slavery a humanitarian institution, and the slave a real member of the family. But the admission most fatal to his theory is in agreeing that the slave qua man may be a subject of friendship, and in advocating his manumission as a reward for good behavior. With this, the attempted distinction between him, qua slave and qua man, utterly breaks down, and the existence of natural slaves is virtually denied. Thus the great champion of slavery in the ancient world, by his very defense of it, repudiates its right as a natural institution. His actual conception of the relation is, indeed, not far from the ideal of Plato, a union for the best mutual service of rulers and ruled, in which the slave receives from his master a moral exchange value for his physical service.

There is a certain economic and moral truth, also, in the attitude of Aristotle toward slavery, that, as Ruskin has observed, higher civilization and culture must have a foundation of menial labor, and that the only justification of such a situation is in the assumption that some are naturally fitted for the higher, and some for the lower, sphere. Such modern laborers are not technically slaves, but Aristotle would insist that they are in a still worse condition, since they are deprived of the humanizing and moralizing influences of a rational master. The plausibility of such a contention would be well illustrated by the wretched condition of multitudes of negroes after the Civil War, as also by the hopeless life of a large portion of the modern industrial army. Moreover, the economic slavery of many of the common toilers today is less justifiable than the domestic slavery advocated by Aristotle, for it too often means a life of indolence and self-indulgence for the masters, instead of that Greek leisure which gave opportunity for higher activity.

MONEY

To the theory of money Aristotle makes a substantial contribution. He agrees with Plato that money found its origin in the growth of necessary exchange, which in turn resulted from an increased division of labor. Unlike Plato, however, he gives a detailed history of the development of money. Before its invention, all exchange was by barter. But with the growth of commerce, barter became difficult, and a common medium of exchange was agreed upon. Something was chosen that was a commodity, having intrinsic value (ὁτῶν χρησίμων αὐτὸ ὄν) and that was easy to handle (εὐμεταχείριστον) in the business of life such as iron, silver, or other metal. It was first uncoined, defined merely by size and weight. Finally, to avoid the inconvenience, it was given a stamp (χαρακτήρ) representative of the quantity (σημεῖον τοῦ πόσου). Thus arose the use of money as a convenience in necessary exchange, but once having arisen, it became the foundation of false finance and retail trade, which are pursued as a science of gain. All this accords well with the facts as now accepted, yet how utterly different is Aristotle’s standpoint from that of the modern historian of economic institutions is revealed by his last statement, and indeed by the setting of the entire passage. His history of money is merely incidental to his purpose of showing that money is the parent and the very life of the false finance which he decries.

He is also more explicit than the other Greek theorists on the function of money. He clearly recognizes the two functions noted by Plato, but he deals with them in a much more detailed manner. His discussion grows out of his theory of distributive justice presented in the Ethics. Money was introduced as the exchangeable representative of demand (ὑπάλλαγμα τῆς χρείας), since diverse products must be reduced to some common denominator. It is thus a medium of exchange, acting as a measure of all inferior and superior values, by making them all commensurable (συμβλητά).

The other important function of money recognized is as a guaranty (ἐγγυητής) of future exchange. It represents the abiding, rather than the temporary, need, and is thus a standard of deferred payments. The importance of money in the fulfilment of these functions is great, in the opinion of Aristotle. The possibility of fair exchange, or indeed the very existence of organized society depends upon it.

He is also clearer than Plato and Xenophon in his definition of the relation between money and wealth. He severely criticizes the current mercantilistic theory of his day, which identified wealth with a quantity of current coin (νομίσματος πλῆθος). He immediately follows this, however, with a more extended presentation of the opposite error of the Cynics, that money is mere trash (λῆρος), depending for its value entirely upon convention (νόμῳ). This theory, he points out, is based on the fact that, if money ceased to be recognized as legal tender, it would be useless; that it satisfies no direct necessity; and that one might starve like Midas, though possessed of it in superabundance.

Aristotle is here somewhat ambiguous as to his own attitude toward this doctrine. He fails to object that money does not necessarily become valueless when it ceases to be legal tender, and that a similar argument might be used to prove that clothing is not wealth. Instead, he uses the idea as a means of refuting the opposite error, which is more obnoxious to him, and on the basis of it he plunges into his discussion of the true and false finance. This, together with a passage in the Ethics, might point to the conclusion that he agreed with the doctrine of the Cynics on money. He states that it was introduced by agreement (κατὰ συνθήκην); that, owing to this, it is called νόμισμα, because its value is not natural but legal; and that it may, at any time, be changed or made useless. In the light of other evidence, however, it seems probable that he here meant to emphasize merely the fact that the general agreement of a community is necessary before anything can be used as a symbol of demand. In stating that it may be made useless, he probably referred to money itself, rather than the material of it, which is, of course, true. His determined opposition to the mercantile theory of money, as the basis of false finance, caused him to appear to subscribe to the opposite error. That, in actual fact, he did recognize the necessity of intrinsic value as an attribute of money is clearly evidenced by another passage, where he specifies it. He says that the material chosen as money was a commodity and easy to handle. This can mean only that it is subject to demand and supply, like any other object of exchange. This inference is substantiated by another passage, which declares that the value of money fluctuates, like that of other things, only not in the same degree. Moreover, in his enumeration of the diverse kinds of wealth, money is regularly included. It seems evident, therefore, that he did not fall a victim of either error, but recognized that, though money is only representative wealth, yet it is itself a commodity, whose value changes with supply and demand, like other goods. Since he understood the use of money as a standard of deferred payments, he also saw clearly the necessity of a stable monetary standard.

Though Aristotle defines money as representative wealth, like Plato, he fails to apprehend its meaning as representative, and therefore productive capital. In his eyes, such a use of money is unjust and contrary to nature. He counts usury (τοκισμός) to be a large part of that false finance, which turns money from its true function to be made an object of traffic. Those who lend small sums at a high rate of interest are contemptible, and petty usury (ἡ ὀβολοστατική) is the most unnatural and violent form of chrematistik, since it makes money reproduce money. It is to be observed, however, that his criticism is directed chiefly against petty interest, and that he does not appear to be thinking of “heavy loans on the security of a whole cargo, but of petty lendings to the necessitous poor, at heavy interest.” Though his entire account of false finance exhibits an animus against the precious metals, as its basal cause, and as the source of individual and national degeneration, yet he clearly appreciates their necessary function in the state, and his hostility is actually directed against the spirit of commercialism. Money, the means, has usurped the place of the end, until domestic and public economy alike have come to mean only the vulgar art of acquisition.

The usual explanation of the fact that the Greek theorists failed to grasp the fact of the productive power of money is that loans were almost entirely for consumption, and hence seemed like an oppression of the poor. This explanation, however, does not accord with the facts of Athenian life, at least for Aristotle’s day. It is clear from the Private Orations of Demosthenes that there did exist an extensive banking and credit system for productive purposes in the Athens of his time. Moreover, the hostility to interest and credit was not the rule, but the exception, for Demosthenes and not the philosophers should be accepted as voicing public opinion on this point. He considered credit to be of as much importance as money itself in the business world, and declared one who ignored this elementary fact to be a mere know-nothing. Indeed, the money-lenders were, to him, the very foundation of the prosperity of the state. The prejudice of Plato and Aristotle represent merely the exceptional attitude of the pure moralist, who because of the questionable tactics of money-lenders, and the injustice and greed in some phases of contemporary business life, became critics of all money-making operations.

EXCHANGE

Aristotle, in both the Politics and the Ethics, deals at considerable length with the subject of exchange. He states that it arose out of the natural situation (κατὰ φύσιν) and defines this as “the fact that men had more of some commodities and less of others than they needed.” At first, all exchange was by barter (ἀλλαγή) and there was no trading except for specific need. The development of an international commerce of import and export was made possible by the invention of money. It is this significant fact that furnishes the line of division between the old natural economy and the era of commerce and finance, when exchange and money have become the tools for unlimited individual enrichment.

His theory of exchange and just price grows out of his application to exchange of his definition of corrective justice, as a mean between two extremes of injustice. Trade is just when each party to it has the exact equivalent (ἴσον) in value with which he began. Exchange is a mean between profit and loss, which themselves have no proper relation to its true purpose. This does not mean that the traders must receive the same in return (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ᾽ ἰσότητα), but an equivalent, or proportional requital (τὸ ἀντιπεπονθὸς κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν). It is this fact of proportional requital that makes exchange, and indeed human society, possible. The meaning is illustrated by a proportion in which the producers bear the same relation to each other as their products. By joining means and extremes, the exchangers are brought to a basis of proportional equality (τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἴσον). Thus is determined how many shoes, the shoemaker’s product, must be given for a house, the builder’s product, and the prices of the two commodities are justly settled, with relation to each other. It is very necessary for just exchange, that such proportional equality be effected before the requital or actual transfer takes place. Otherwise one will gain both superiorities (ἀμφοτέρας τὰς ὑπεροχάς), and equality becomes impossible, since the cost of production of things is very diverse. Indeed, the arts themselves could not exist, unless the advantage to the consumer were similar in quantity and quality to the cost to the producer.

The common element in diverse products that makes them commensurable is need, or demand (ἡ χρεία), for reciprocal services. But on the basis of the need of the moment, or under the régime of barter, just exchange would be practically impossible, since the concrete needs of A and B, at any given moment, are not likely to correspond. In such a case, exchange would be a gross disregard of the cost of production. This has been avoided by the introduction of money as a substitute for demand, a symbol of general, rather than specific need. Thus just exchange becomes possible, for money, as the representative of general need, is always equally in demand by all, and, as the common denominator of value, it alone renders it possible for proportional amounts of each product to be exchanged.

Aristotle’s basal premise in this theory of fair exchange, that unless an equal quantum of value is received by each party, one must lose what the other gains, has been severely criticized by Menger. He objects that the determining consideration in exchange is not the equal value of exchanged goods. On the contrary, men trade only when they expect to better their economic condition. “Um ihres economischen Vortheils willen, nicht um gleiches gegen gleiches hinzugeben; sondern um ihre Bedürfnisse so vollständig als unter den gegebenen Verhältnissen dies zulässig ist zu befriedigen.” Each gives the other only so much of his own goods as is necessary to secure this end, and it is this competition in open market that fixes prices. Barker also criticizes Aristotle on the ground that he takes no account of demand in his theory of just price. He states that if the cost of production were the only element to be considered, the doctrine might be correct, but with the entrance of demand, one may buy at a low price and sell at an advance without injustice.

Of course, the bald theory that, in exchange, one necessarily loses what the other gains, is untenable. Yet there is still something to be said for Aristotle. He recognized, as well as Menger, that exchange, as pursued by the retailers, did not square with his idea of just price. This is the very reason why he objects to retail trade. He is presenting exchange, not as it is, but as he believes it should be pursued. His doctrine, in a nutshell, is that the primary purpose of exchange is profit, defined as economic satisfaction of mutual needs, not profit in dollars and cents. The equality that he seeks, too, is not so much an equality of value in obols and drachmas, but that each shall receive an equal quantum of economic satisfaction. This is the true standpoint at bottom, and when, as is common, the mere purpose of money-making dominates in the pursuit of exchange, the profit is too often at the expense of the other party. Such exchange certainly does not mean economic advance or general prosperity. It merely makes possible an increase in the inequalities of wealth and poverty. There is much of fallacy in the prevalent idea that business necessarily increases the wealth of a state. Ruskin, though like Aristotle extreme and one-sided in his view, struck at the root of this error. He also declared that the result of exchange should be advantage, not profit, and repudiated the idea that the mere fact that goods change hands necessarily means general enrichment. The central truth in their protest needed to be spoken, though both erred in not sufficiently recognizing that the labor involved in exchange creates an added time and place value, and therefore has a right to be called productive. They also failed to observe the fact of the necessary risk involved in the business of exchange, which should be repaid with a fair additional profit. For the cornering of markets and the manipulation of prices, for the sake of individual enrichment, modern economists and statesmen, with Aristotle and Ruskin, are fast coming to have only words of protest.

Moreover, contrary to Barker’s assertion, demand, as an element of price, is prominent throughout this discussion of Aristotle. He objects, however, to allowing the effect of demand to overcome unduly the cost of production, thus causing inequality and injustice. According to his idea, each receives the equivalent in value of what he gives, in the sense that it is a resultant of the proportionate influence of both cost and need. We may, nevertheless, observe an excellent example of inconsistency in the fact that, despite his insistence upon just exchange, he appears to treat monopoly as a legitimate principle of finance for both men and states, though his intention in the passage may have been to discuss actual conditions, rather than to idealize.

Naturally, the philosopher shows no concern for a tax on imports as a means of building up the industry and commerce of his state, since he is especially desirous of limiting both. However, he is not blind to the advantages of export and import trade for a nation, but would regulate them with an ethical, rather than an economic purpose. His doctrine of exchange as a form of production has been discussed above, and will be touched upon further in the following pages. His general criticism of what he terms “false finance” or “chrematistik” (χρηματιστική) remains for more extended treatment.

We have seen that he recognizes the necessity of a limited form of exchange, free from the purpose of gain, and considers such trading to be natural and in accord with that interdependence which nature demands. He calls it the very bond of the social organization, and even considers international commerce to be necessary for the prosperity of a state. We have also seen that he goes so far as to advise the rich in a democracy to give the poor a start in business, but that exchange, in its prevalent form, is to him a method of cheatery, in which one gains what the other loses.

On the basis of this prejudice, he builds his argument for domestic economy (οἰκονομική) as opposed to false finance. We will therefore consider his entire theory of this relation at this point, for the term “chrematistik,” though more inclusive than exchange (μεταβλητική), has trade in either goods or money (καπηλική) as its predominating element, and the two terms are often used by him as synonyms. He employs the word χρηματιστική in several significations—usually of unnatural finance, or the art of money-making by exchange of goods or money; sometimes as synonymous with κτητική, the general term for the entire business of acquisition, including both natural and unnatural finance; again, of the natural finance, which is a part of domestic economy. His confusion results partly from his futile attempt to separate landed property from general industry and commerce.

His main contention is that there is a vital distinction between domestic economy, whether of householder (οἰκονόμος) or statesman, and the art of acquisition or finance, as usually pursued. The primary function of the art of finance is to provide, while that of domestic economy is to use what is provided. There are, however, many methods of acquisition (κτητική; χρηματιστική), some of which truly belong to the sphere of domestic economy. The provision of all that is furnished by nature herself, as necessary to human existence, then, if not already at hand (ὑπάρχειν), belongs properly to domestic economy. It both uses and provides genuine wealth, such as is limited in amount (οὐκ ἄπειρος) yet sufficient for independence (αὐτάρκεια) and the good life. But the use of such wealth is its chief business. The other kind of acquisition, which is unlimited, or chrematistik, is contrary to nature, and is not in the province of domestic economy. This unnatural finance, since it deals chiefly in the exchange of money and other commodities, may be termed retail trade (καπηλική). Though itself false, it is a logical outgrowth (κατὰ λόγον) of the true form of exchange that is limited to actual needs as a result of the invention of money. But the real reason for its pursuit is to satisfy an evil and unlimited desire for material things. It produces money merely through the exchange of money (δι1α χρημάτων μεταβολῆς),[##] and its beginning and end is unlimited currency.

This false form of acquisition is often confused with necessary exchange, because both deal with money. Their aims, however, are quite diverse. The latter treats the accumulation of money (αὔξησις) as a means, while the former treats it as the supreme end of life. In fine, then, Aristotle teaches that necessary chrematistik has to do with the supply and use of life’s necessities, is natural (κατὰ φύσιν or οἰκειοτάτη) and limited, its prime function being the proper disposal of products. It is an honorable pursuit, dependent chiefly upon fruits and animals, and involves a practical knowledge of stock (κτηνή), farming, bee-culture, trees, fish, and fowl. The false finance, on the other hand, is unnatural, dishonorable, and enriches at the expense of another. Its chief business is commerce (ἐμπορία), including sea-trade (ναυκληρία), inland trade (φορτηγία), and shop-trade, (παράστασις). It also comprises usury (τοκισμός) and hired labor, both skilled and unskilled (μισθαρνία ἡ μὲν τῶν βαναύσων τέχνων ἡ δὲ ἀτεχνῶν).

Aristotle also distinguishes a third type of finance (χρηματιστική) which shares in the nature of both those above described. It deals with natural resources and their products, but with things which, though useful, are not fruits (ἀκάρπιμα), such as wood-cutting (ὑλοτομία) and mining in all its branches (μεταλλευτική). The meaning may be best apprehended if, with Ashley, we observe that οἰκονομική is characterized, not only by direct acquisition of nature’s products, but also by a personal use of the same, while the unnatural finance has neither of these qualities. The medium kind, then, is like the former, in that it involves direct acquisition of natural resources, but like the latter, in that it does not acquire for directly personal use, but for exchange. It consists, therefore, not so much in the arts themselves, as in the exchange that is based on them.

In the discussion of the so-called false finance, Aristotle thus reveals a markedly hostile attitude to any extensive development of exchange. The middleman is considered to be a parasite and necessarily degenerate by the very fact of his business. As seen above, his criticism was doubtless directed chiefly against the mean and dishonest spirit in the actual retail trade and money-loaning of his day. Yet here also, just as in the Ethics passage above discussed, his prejudice blinds him to the fact that exchangers may be real producers, and that, after all, even the alleged false finance is not unlimited, but that it is distinctly bounded by economic demand. Still worse, he includes hired labor of every kind under unlimited acquisition, merely because it has some of the other qualities of that type of economy, though it certainly does not tend to unlimited enrichment even as much as agriculture. However, he should be given credit of being a forerunner of the modern humanitarian economy, which insists that the final goal of all economics should be proper consumption, and that acquisition must be relegated to its true place as a means, the supreme end being human welfare.

POPULATION

Aristotle exhibits an interest in the problem of population in relation to subsistence in his criticism of Plato for limiting the amount of property and making it indivisible, while failing to provide against a too high birth-rate. He states the principle that, if property is to be limited, there must be a corresponding limitation on the increase of population, and that the let-alone policy must be followed by increased poverty. He therefore criticizes the Spartan law, for encouraging the largest possible families. It is evident, however, that, as in the case of Plato, his interest in the problem is prompted chiefly by a moral and political motive. It arises merely from his desire to limit individual acquisition, in a small state, artificially constructed, and is to him in no sense a question of world food-supply.

DISTRIBUTION

In the Ethics passage discussed above, Aristotle approaches a scientific theory of distribution. He observes that just distribution will be a mean between two extremes of unfairness. Unlike some moderns, however, he realizes that this will not mean equal shares for all. There must be the same ratio between the persons, or services, and the things. In the “mutual exchange of services,” the law must be proportional requital. In other words, each should receive an equivalent to what he contributes. Distribution must thus proceed according to a certain standard of worth or desert (κατ᾽ ἀξίαν τινά). If the individuals are unequal, their shares cannot be equal, and it is a prolific source of dispute, whenever equals receive unequal shares, or unequals receive equal. On the other hand, Aristotle recognizes that it is a difficult matter to determine this standard, by which just distribution is to proceed. At this point, again, he shows clearly that his paramount interest in the problem is not economic. He names four possible standards—freedom, wealth, noble birth, and general excellence—all of which are distinctly political in their reference.

Though he insists on a fair distribution of wealth to the citizens, he can hardly be said to exhibit as much interest in the welfare of the common people as does Plato. He had not a very ideal conception of human nature in general. He would have thought it not only impracticable, but undesirable to give his doctrine of leisure any extensive application. As seen above, he includes all hired labor under false finance, and relegates all industry, including agriculture, to the slaves and strangers. The life of mechanic and commercial alike is to him ignoble. He advises that measures be taken to hold the workers in submission and obedience. His unfair criticism of Plato’s Republic, however, on the ground that it fails to emphasize sufficiently the welfare of the parts of the state, and that it does not distinguish clearly enough the status of the commons, reveals a spirit that does not entirely disregard the masses. His demand that no citizen shall lack subsistence, his provision of the sussitia for all, his insistence that, in the market, mere economic self-interest shall not rule, and his emphasis on the importance of a strong middle class in the state, all show that, in the interest of the perpetuity of the state at least, he had some regard for the economic well-being of all classes. It would be wrong to infer from his suggestions for the aid of the masses in a democracy, that he would offer similar advice for the ideal state. Moreover, his chief emphasis in the passage is upon the idea of Mill, that mere hand-to-mouth help of the poor is wasteful, and that what is needed is to aid them to become economically independent. Nevertheless his suggestion does show that he saw clearly the relation that exists in a democracy between the economic condition of the masses and the stability of the state. He says that the genuine friend of the people (ἀληθινῶς δημοτικός) will see that the masses are not very poor, for the best assurance of the abiding welfare of the state is the solid prosperity of the great majority of the population. He therefore advises the rich to contribute money for furnishing plots of land or capital for small business enterprises to the needy poor. However, while the advice seems, on the surface, to favor the commons, it is really a prudent suggestion to the upper classes, appealing to their selfish interest to avoid by this method the danger of a discontented proletariat. Nevertheless, the general economic attitude of Aristotle would warrant including him, with the other Greek thinkers, in the statement of Roscher: “Die hellenische Volkswirtschaftslehre hat niemals den grossen Fehler begangen, über dem Reichtume die Menschen zu vergessen, und über der Vermehrung der Menschenzahl, der Wohlstand der einzelnen gering zu achten.”

Aristotle makes clear his attitude toward the institution of private property and other related questions, both in his criticism of other thinkers, and in his own positive suggestions for the ideal state. Through his objections to the systems of Phaleas and Plato, he has acquired the reputation of being the great defender of private property in Greece. We shall see the extent to which this interpretation of him is correct. Our consideration of his theory may be summarized under certain topics which are fundamental to the problem of distribution.

He admits that the doctrine of economic equality may have some wisdom in it. The attempt to equalize possessions may tend slightly to prevent civic discord. Yet it is liable to arouse sedition on the part of the exploited classes, and such relief measures will satisfy the masses only for a time, for they are notoriously insatiate. In his opinion, therefore, the saner remedy is equalization of desires rather than of property, which must be realized by proper education and a right constitution, whereby the upper classes shall not oppress, and the masses shall be held in check. We have here still a valid argument against the more radical type of socialism. It is suggestive of the modern doctrine of private property as a public trust, and presents clearly the antithesis between the attitude of Greek thinkers and that of the modern social democracy.

Aristotle argues further that equalization of property would be powerless to prevent anything more than the merely petty crimes, for the grossest ones are the result of inordinate desire, rather than of inability to provide life’s necessities. Moreover, there are many other natural inequalities of life what would remain to arouse discontent. This is a sensible observation that has often been overlooked by modern radical socialists, though its author might have objected further that such personal diversities would also render an abiding equality of property impossible. His previous argument, however, that immorality and crimes are the result of inordinate desire, rather than of economic need, might be answered today by the results of investigations upon the relation of wages to morality.

The doctrine of communistic equality, as preached by some theorists in fifth- and fourth-century Greece, and as satirized by Aristophanes, had no appeal for Aristotle. It was, to him, merely a thinly veiled individualism. He saw through the selfish partisanship of both oligarchs and democrats, and recognized that all men are poor judges in matters that concern themselves. The excessive individualism of the radical democrat of his day, which permitted the majority to confiscate the property of the minority in the name of a false equality, was as hateful to him as it was to Plato. As seen above, he insisted that economic or political equality should not be demanded, except on the basis of equality of service. Exploitation by the radical democracy was, in his eyes, as bad as the rule of a tyrant, and the ruthless individualism of the classes was no better. Like Plato, he would oppose to both of these the common interest, and would unite both masses and classes in the aim to realize the highest moral life for the individual through the state. He refuted the Sophist’s theory of social contract and of justice as a mere convention. As Stewart has observed he realized that “more powerful causes than the mere perception of material advantage brought men into social union and keep them in it.” Each citizen, he held, is not his own master, but all belong to the state. Each is a member (μόριον) of the social body, and the concern of each is naturally relative to the good of the whole.

Aristotle’s further criticisms, of minor significance, on the suggestions of Phaleas and Plato for equality of possessions are as follows: They have taken no precautions to regulate population accordingly. They set no proper limit between luxury and penury for individual possessions. Plato’s system is not thoroughgoing, since it allows inequalities in personal property, a criticism also valid against his own proposals. Phaleas failed to include personal property in his system of equality. Such strictures seem to proceed from his pedantic desire to criticize inconsistency. However, he may have apprehended more clearly than did Plato the danger of the press of poverty that must eventually result from a system like that of the Laws.

Our author is also strong in his denial of either the wisdom or feasibility of the communism in the Republic. He argues that Plato’s proposed family communism is based upon the false principle that a state must be composed of like elements, and shows that it must fail to accomplish its end of harmony, for Plato’s “all” must mean all collectively. But this must result, if realized, in a decrease of devotion, and thus in a lack of the very harmony sought, since one of the chief sources of attachment in the world is exclusive ownership. He would deem such a measure, therefore, more fitting for the third class, since a weakening of their ties of affection might result in greater submission to the rulers, another striking evidence of the gulf that separates the ideal of Greek political thought from the spirit of modern democracy.

Moreover, he considers Plato’s assumption that a state, to be a unity, must be devoid of all private interests, to be gratuitous, and argues that the common possession of anything is more likely to cause strife than harmony. In his opinion, the present system of private property, if accompanied by a right moral tone and proper laws, combines the advantages of both common and individual ownership. The tenure of property should therefore be private, but there should be a certain friendly community in its actual use. Thus will be avoided the double evil of strife and neglect, which must result from dissatisfaction and lack of personal interest under communism. He offers as a substitute for the Platonic doctrine, then, his own ideal of reciprocal equality (τὸ ἴσον τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός) as the real cement of society. In any event, he asserts, the present evils do not result from private property, but from the depravity of human nature (μοχθηρίαν), and the aim should be to improve this by moral and intellectual culture, rather than to attempt amelioration by the establishment of an entirely new system. The latter method would result, even if successful, not only in escape from some of the present evils, but also in the loss of the present advantages of private tenure.

The foregoing arguments all show remarkable practical insight, and have been common in the modern criticism of socialism. The objection that individual effort and industry would be paralyzed if bereft of the stimulus of personal interest and ownership, while a general fact of human nature, need not be valid against a system where each has opportunity to develop up to his capacity. There is certainly little to impel the great mass of people to industry under an individualistic system, except the proverbial wolf at the door. But Aristotle is not thinking of the masses. The objection that the evils result from human nature, not from the economic system, may well be pondered by modern socialists and doctrinaire reformers, yet this very fact is an additional reason why the system should be reformed so as to curb such wrong tendencies. The emphasis upon education as a cure for the existing ills is wise, and it might well be more fully recognized by modern socialists, though both Aristotle and later critics of proposed social reforms are wrong in implying that the two methods are mutually exclusive. The warning that, by giving up the régime of private properly, we should not only be rid of its evils, but also lose its advantages, should be pondered by agitators against the existing economic system. Modern socialists might also learn much from Aristotle and the other Greek thinkers in regard to the true social ideal, as not primarily materialistic and selfish, but moral and social. On the whole, it may be observed that Aristotle’s criticism of Plato’s alleged communism in the Republic would be far more applicable against modern socialism.

As to the sussitia, Aristotle proposes a system similar to that of Plato’s Laws. He harshly criticizes the Spartan method, which required every citizen, rich and poor alike, to contribute to the common meals on pain of loss of citizenship. He praises, on the other hand, the Cretan system, which permitted the entire citizenship, including women and children, to be nourished at the common table, at public expense.

We have seen that Plato, in the Laws, while apparently granting private property in land, really denies this, since he makes the product of the land practically public property. Aristotle, despite his strictures against communism, advocates a system of land tenure quite similar. His limitation of the freedom of donation or testament, purchase or sale; his demands that the lot shall never leave the family, that it shall always be handed down by legitimate succession, and that no citizen shall ever be allowed to hold more than one allotment, are all Platonic, and make him unquestionably an advocate of family, rather than of private ownership of land. His collectivism is more direct than that of the Laws, since he makes part of the land entirely public, to defray the expense of worship and the common meals. The assignment of lots to the citizens is on the same terms as in the Laws, with the exception that the owners are masters of the product of their lots. Despite his criticism of Plato’s division of homesteads, he has the same plan. As in the Laws, only citizens are landowners, and this includes only the governing and military classes, while all husbandmen are to be public or private slaves. Unlike Plato, however, Aristotle does not attempt to avoid undue inequalities in personal property. He sets no maximum above which limit goods must be confiscated, nor does he, as Plato, establish a rigorous system of laws to hamper trade and to make money-making operations practically impossible. He recognizes that such regulations are not feasible, and his legislation is therefore more considerate of human nature, despite the fact that his hostility to the ideal of commercialism is even more pronounced than is that of Plato.

It is evident from the preceding outline of Aristotle’s negative and positive doctrine on the matter of private property that his system is in substantial agreement with that of Plato’s second state. Besides the points of similarity noted above, he agrees with his predecessor in emphasizing strongly the power of the state over the life of the citizens. Both insist that the citizen belongs, not to himself, but to the state, and can realize his best life only through the state. Thus Aristotle is far from being a defender of private property in the absolute sense. On the other hand, his emphasis upon the social obligation of individual possession is, if not socialistic, at least very modern. He is certainly a much better socialist than the alleged communist of the Republic, whom he criticizes so severely. Like the Plato of the Laws, he is a semi-collectivist. As Barker has observed, Aristotle thought in terms of land, while modern socialism thinks in terms of capital and labor. Both standpoints involve social ownership and the limitation of the individual, and in this respect the Greek thinker was socialistic in tendency. But despite their social spirit and their trend toward nationalism, which is so strong in all progressive countries today, neither he nor Plato was a socialist, in the modern sense, in spirit or in aim. Any attempts at direct comparison with modern socialism, therefore, are likely to be fanciful and confusing. Whatever analogy there is between them is of a very general nature and should not be pressed.

Footnote 517:

Cf. infra for the Economica, which is generally recognised to be from a later member of the Peripatetic school, about 250-200 B.C.; cf. Susemihl, Economica, Intro. to the ed.; Croiset, op. cit., IV, 710; Zeller, op. cit., II, 2, 944 ff. Moreover, it deals chiefly with the practical phase of economics. On the other hand, we shall cite Eud. Eth. and Mag. mor. under Aristotle, since, though later than him, they merely imitate his thought, in so far as they touch economics. For the numerous and diverse writings ascribed to Aristotle, cf. Christ, op. cit., IV , 684 ff.

Footnote 518:

B. St. Hilaire (preface to his French translation of the Politics, pp. 4-11) calls him “le créateur de l’économie politique.” Zmavc (Archiv f. d. Gesch. d. Philos. , pp. 407 ff.) also tends to overestimate him.

Footnote 519:

Zmavc (ibid, and also Zeitschr. f. d. gesammt. Staatswiss. , pp. 48 ff.) emphasizes this fact.

Footnote 520:

Pol. i. 1. 1252a7-13, cited on p. 9, n. 5, a criticism of Plato’s Politics 258E-259C; on the truth in this confusion, cf. p. 10. Even Adam Smith said: “What is wise with a family can hardly be foolish with a great kingdom.”

Footnote 521:

Besides St. Hilaire and Zmavc, cited above, among those favorable are Cossa, Hist. des doctrines economiques, p. 149; Blanqui, op. cit., I, 49, 86. More reserved are Souchon, op. cit., p. 127; DuBois, op. cit., p. 50; Haney, op. cit., pp. 47 f.; unfair interpretation, Dühring, op. cit., pp. 20 f.

Footnote 522:

i. 9. 1257a6-9: ἑκάστου γὰρ κτήματος διττὴ ἡ χρῆσίς ἐστιν ἀμφότεραι δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοίως καθ᾽ αὑτό, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν οἰκεία ἡ δ᾽ οὐκ οἰκεία τοῦ πράγματος οἱον ὑποδήματος ἥ τε ὑπόδεσις καὶ ἡ μεταβλητική.

Footnote 523:

Wealth of Nations, I, chap. iv.

Footnote 524:

Cf. Souchon, op. cit., p. 127; Haney, op. cit., p. 47.

Footnote 525:

Unless this is implied in κτήματος, 1257a6, as ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μεταβλητικὴ πάντων (14 f.) might seem to indicate. Zmavc (Archiv., etc., p. 410) points to 1253b33-39, on the automatic tripods of Hephaestus, as implying it, but if so it was unintended by Aristotle. But cf. infra, pp. 84 and 86, n. 4, where it is recognized.

Footnote 526:

1257a11; 5-19, but not specifically stated, and the term χρεία does not occur here.

Footnote 527:

i. 7. 14: καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου ἀχρηστότερος ὤν· ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τε ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις ὑπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει· ὅθεν λέγεται ἄριστον μὲν ὕδωρ. Cf. Pind. Ol. i. 1 and Cope-Sandys ed. of Ar. Rhet. (I, pp. 130 f., 1877).

Footnote 528:

Ibid.

Footnote 529:

V, v. 8-14. 1133a5-1133b10 ff.

Footnote 530:

E.g., Stewart.

Footnote 531:

1133a5-12; 15 f.; 18; cf. Eud. Eth. vii. 10. 1243b28-38.

Footnote 532:

N. Eth. 1133a5-12, etc., 12 f.: οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει κρεῖττον εἶναι το θατέρου ἔργον ἢ τὸ θατέρου. The emphasis seems to be on quality of labor, as suggested by κρεῖττον. Cf. both ὅσον and οἷον (15) and p. 84 n. 3.

Footnote 533:

Ibid. 7-10; by joining means and extremes together, the proportionate exchange is effected. Cf. also 1133b4 ff.; 1133a32 f. As observed by Ritchie (Palgrave’s Dictionary, art. “Aristotle”) and H. Sewall (op. cit., p. 3, n. 2), the proportion is clearer to moderns if we make our standard one hour of labor of each workman instead of the men themselves.

Footnote 534:

Stewart (Notes to N. Eth. I, 449) suggests that this gives what the economists call “natural value,” but that the market value oscillates from this because of supply and demand.

Footnote 535:

1133a25-27; 1133b6 f. Cf. p. 34, n. 5, for Plato’s use of the term.

Footnote 536:

Op. cit., pp. 47 f.

Footnote 537:

Cf. the discussion and notes above; also 1133a15 f., where both elements seem to be recognized, though the meaning of the passage is disputed. Cf. infra, p. 108, n. 3.

Footnote 538:

1133a19 ff.; 29; 1133b10 ff., cited infra, on money. It clearly distinguishes the quality of exchangeableness. Cf. iv. 1. 1119b26 f., cited infra, n. 7. Cf. pp. 38 f. for Plato’s theory.

Footnote 539:

So Stewart, op. cit., in loc.; Zmavc, Archiv., etc., p. 415, who criticizes Karl Marx (Kapital, 4th ed., I, 26) for denying this. Barker (op. cit., p. 379) says that Aristotle did not recognize the “seller’s cost of production”; but cf. 384, where he implies the opposite.

Footnote 540:

But cf. his definition of wealth, pp. 85 f.

Footnote 541:

Bonar (op. cit., p. 40) criticizes him for this. The words ἀξία and τίμη are not used in the passage, but for the former in a very dear economic sense, cf. iv. 1. 1119b26-27; χρήματα δὲ λέγομεν πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται.

Footnote 542:

For further discussion of this Ethics passage, cf. infra on money, exchange, and distribution. Mag. mor. i. 33. 1193b19-1194b2 repeats the idea, citing Plato Rep. on the exchange of the four producers in his primitive state.

Footnote 543:

i. 8. 1256b28-32. The term ἄπειρος, as applied to wealth, is used by Plato and Aristotle of undue love of money (Rep. 373D, 591D; Laws 870A); for Aristotle, cf. passage above and infra. There is a sense, even from the economic standpoint, in which wealth is not unlimited.

Footnote 544:

Prin. of Pol. Econ., preliminary remarks, and Book I, chap. iii, 3.

Footnote 545:

On this term in Plato and Aristotle, cf. infra under exchange.

Footnote 546:

Op. cit., p. 374; cf. infra on the moral attitude of Aristotle to wealth.

Footnote 547:

His unfair criticism of Plato seems to argue otherwise (Rep. 369C ff.; Pol. 1291a12-19), but cf. infra.

Footnote 548:

ii. 7. 1267b10 ff.; 1254a16 f.; Rhet. i. 5. 1361a12 ff.

Footnote 549:

Pol. 1254a16 ff.: κτῆμα δὲ ὄργανον πρακτικὸν καὶ χωριστὸν, similar to Walker’s term “transferability” (Pol. Econ., 3d ed., p. 5); cf. Mill, op. cit., preliminary remarks on the term.

Footnote 550:

N. Eth. iv. 1. 1119b26 f., cited on p. 84, n. 7.

Footnote 551:

Cf. the discussion above on value; cf. Mill, op. cit., Book I, chap, iii, 3, on the quality of “storableness” as an attribute of wealth. Newman (Pol. of Ar., II, note to 1256b26 ff.) asks if θησαυρισμός can be applied to slaves and cattle, and if the definition can include land. These are all included; cf. n. 1, above.

Footnote 552:

Pol. i. 9. 1257a6 and 14 f., and the discussion above of N. Eth. 1133a5 ff.

Footnote 553:

Cf. n. 3.

Footnote 554:

Cf. Smith, op. cit., IV, for criticism of this basal confusion of the mercantile theory.

Footnote 555:

Rhet. B. 16. 1390-91.

Footnote 556:

Pol. i. 8. 1256b31 f.; N. Eth. i. 8. 1099a31-33, especially ἁδύνατον γὰρ ἢ οὐ ῥάδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχορήγητον ὄντα; 1101a14 f., in the definition of the εὐδαίμων man.

Footnote 557:

Pol. iii. 6. 1265a32 f.: ἐλευθέρως; N. Eth. iii., chaps. 13-14 on σωφροσύνη, and iv, chaps. 1, 2, on ἐλευθεριότης and ἀσωτία; but display of wealth is vulgar (iv. 2. 1123a19-22). Ruskin (Stones of Venice, VIII, 69 [Vol. X, 389]) refers to Aristotle on liberality.

Footnote 558:

ἡ δὲ πενία στάσιν ἐμποιεῖ καί κακουργίαν.

Footnote 559:

v. 1. 1129b3; so Mag. mor. B. 3. 1199b6-9, 14-35; cf. N. Eth. i. 8. 1098b31 ff. for a similar distinction between habit (ἕξις) and practice (χρῆσις) of virtue.

Footnote 560:

v. 1. 1129b4-6; cf. Pol. i. 10. 1258a23-27 on the duty of the weaver or statesman; iv (vii). 15. 1334a36 f.; 13. 1332a22 f.

Footnote 561:

Pol. 1332a25 f.

Footnote 562:

Pol. iv (vii). 13. 1332a26 f.

Footnote 563:

N. Eth. i. 8. 1098b12-15; cf. Pol. 1323a25 f.; Rhet. i. 5. 1360b25 ff.; also Mag. mor. A. 3. 1184b1-5 and Eud. Eth. ii. 1. 1218b32.

Footnote 564:

Pol. 1323a40 f.; cf. Jesus’ sentence, “Seek ye first,” etc.; cf. also 1323b19 f.; also pp. 24 ff., Plato.

Footnote 565:

Pol. 1323b, 1-6.

Footnote 566:

N. Eth. i. 5. 1096a5 f.: ὁ δὲ χρηματιστὴς βίαιος τίς ἐστιν. Cf. also Pol. 1256b28-32, discussed above, and i., chaps. 8 and 9, discussed under exchange.

Footnote 567:

Cf. n. 2.

Footnote 568:

Pol. 1323b7-11, and discussion above.

Footnote 569:

1256b36; N. Eth. i. 5. 1906a6 f.; χρήσιμον γὰρ καὶ ἄλλου χάριν; 7. 1097a27: δῆλον ὡς οὔκ ἐστι πάντα τέλεια.

Footnote 570:

Pol. i. 9. 1258a2 ff.; cf. also Mag. mor. B. 3. 1200a-b.

Footnote 571:

1258a10-14, similar to Plato Rep. i. on the arts and their function; cf. a similar passage from Isocrates (Paneg. 76) on the virtues of the Persian War heroes.

Footnote 572:

Pol. iii. 9. 1280a25-32; the chief ambition of a state is not τῶν κτημάτων χάριν, but εῦ ζῆν. Cf. above on the similar preachments of Plato, for their relation to modern economic ideas and conditions. Cf. Plato Crito 48B: οὐ τὸ ζῆν περὶ πλείστου ποιητέον, ἀλλὰ τὸ εῦ ζῆν.

Footnote 573:

Cf. Souchon, op. cit., p. 69; for Greek terms for production, cf. p. 66 and notes.

Footnote 574:

i. 10. 1258a19-38; 4. 1254a7: ὁ δὲ βίος πρᾶξις, οὐ ποίησις ἐστιν.

Footnote 575:

10. 1258a33 ff., τῆς ὑπερετικῆς, impossible for the economist, but true, for the moralist; cf. p. 69 for his distinction (1254a1 ff.) between ὄργανα ποιητικά and κτῆμα πρακτικόν.

Footnote 576:

i. 2.; on both the above, cf. Newman, op. cit., in loc.

Footnote 577:

Cf. especially 1258a34 ff.: μάλιστα δὲ, καθάπερ εἴρεται πρότερον, δεῖ φύσει τοῦτο ὑπάρχειν. Cf. Susemihi and Hicks, Pol. of Ar., I (1894), Intro., p. 30.

Footnote 578:

1256a40 ff., αὐτόφυτος, “self-existent,” with ἔργασία, as here, equals αὐτουργία, “agriculture.”

Footnote 579:

1258b9-27.

Footnote 580:

Op. cit., pp. 96, 98 f., n. 1; cf. Haney, op. cit., p. 47; Kautz, op. cit., p.138; Ingram, op. cit., p. 18. The physiocrats thought that commerce and industry increased the value of raw materials only enough to pay for labor and capital expended. Commerce was an expensive necessity, a tax on agriculture. For a good summary, cf. Haney, pp. 138 ff. Quesnay (Tableau Econ. ) followed Xenophon (Econ. v. 17) as his motto. But the motive of the physiocrats was economic, not moral and political, as was that of Aristotle.

Footnote 581:

Pol. 1258b21 ff.; probably implied also in 1256a40 ff.; but cf. vi (iv). 4. 1291a1 ff., where the mechanic and hired laborer are counted among the necessary parts of the state.

Footnote 582:

1256 ff.; 1256b23 f. To him, production is a branch of acquisition. Cf. p. 28, on Plato’s use of the terms.

Footnote 583:

1258a19-38; 1254a7, cited on p. 88, n. 10.

Footnote 584:

Op. cit., pp. 358, 375 f.

Footnote 585:

Op. cit., p. 39, on the basis of Pol. 1258b34 f.: τὸ δὲ κατὰ μέρος ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι χρήσιμον μὲν πρὸς τὰς ἐργασίας, φορτικὸν δὲ τὸ ἐνδιατρίβειν. φορτικόν may mean merely “tiresome,” not “vulgar.”

Footnote 586:

Cf. Zmavc, Archiv., etc., p. 431; cf. passages cited infra, on the attitude of Aristotle to labor; cf. vi (iv). 4. 1291a1 ff., especially ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι.

Footnote 587:

Pol. 1258a34-38, cited on p. 89, n. 2.

Footnote 588:

1258b9-21.

Footnote 589:

Ibid. 40 ff.; cf. Newman, op. cit., II, 204, on the statements of Varro De re rustica i. 1. 8 and Columella i. 1. 7 that Aristotle and Theophrastus wrote on agriculture. Cf. also (Plato) Axiochus 368C.

Footnote 590:

Pol. iv (vii). 9. 1329a1 f.

Footnote 591:

1254a1 ff.; cf. pp. 68 and 88 for Greek terms.

Footnote 592:

1254a2-4.

Footnote 593:

Op. cit., ii, chap. i.

Footnote 594:

Pol. 1254a7; cf. p. 88, n. 10.

Footnote 595:

Pol. 1254a8 ff. He thinks chiefly of the domestic slave.

Footnote 596:

Unto This Last, p. 61, an unjust criticism of Mill; ibid., IV, 78: “Production is primarily for the mouth, not for the granary.”

Footnote 597:

Op. cit., IV, chap. viii: “Consumption is the sole end and purpose of all production; ... and the interest of the producer ought to be attended to only so far as it may be necessary for promoting that of the consumer.”

Footnote 598:

For reference and Greek terms, cf. p. 68.

Footnote 599:

For his term ἀφορμή cf. p. 68, n. 8, and infra. It probably was a mere business word to him. DuBois (op. cit., p. 38) thinks that he had a very clear idea of its significance.

Footnote 600:

Pol. 1258b12-21; cf. 1258a37 f.

Footnote 601:

Ibid. 21-27, and entire chaps., 8-11. For terms, cf. infra.

Footnote 602:

iv. 1121a29; 1122a14 f.; cf. the stress on δόσις and χρῆσις rather than on κτῆσις and λῆψις, 1120a8-13; b14-16, and Stewart’s notes, I, 323.

Footnote 603:

Rep. 552B, discussed above.

Footnote 604:

Souchon (op. cit., p. 121) seems to think it was.

Footnote 605:

Pol. 1258b8, but cf. p. 39 and infra on this word τόκος. Cf. also Ar. Clouds 20; 1285 ff.; A. Smith, op. cit., II, chap. iv.

Footnote 606:

Souchon (op. cit., p. 97) is hardly fair to Aristotle on this point, but cf. also p. 96, n. 1; cf. Ruskin, Time and Tide, XV, 81 (Vol. XVII, 388); Mun. Pul., Pref., 21 (Vol. XVII, 144); ibid., VI, 139 (p. 264); ibid., 153 and note (p. 277), which cites Laws 743C, on the doctrine that the just are neither rich nor poor.

Footnote 607:

Pol. v (viii). 2. 1337b8-11. The terms for mechanical labor are τέχνη, of ability through practice; δημιουργός, of one who works for the people, rather than for himself or one other; βάναυσος, originally of work by the fire, but later the common term for mechanical labor, usually with a derogatory sense in the philosophers; cf. βαναυσία, “vulgarity,” N. Eth. iv. 4. 1122a31; βάναυσος, “vulgar man,” ibid. 1123a19; Etymol. mag; Schol. to Plato Rep. 495E; Pollux i. 64. 50; Hesychius, s.v. The Greeks did not clearly distinguish the finer from the mechanical arts; cf. Büchsenschütz, op. cit., p. 266; Pol. vi (iv). 4. 1291a1 ff., where all are included under βάναυσον. Cf. Cope-Sandys, Ar. Rhet., 2d ed., I, 9, 27, note. Cf. above, p. 33, n. 7, for Ruskin’s attitude.

Footnote 608:

Pol. 1337b12; 1258b37.

Footnote 609:

1337b13 f.

Footnote 610:

1258b38 f.

Footnote 611:

vii (vi). 4. 1319a26-28.

Footnote 612:

v (viii). 2. 1337b5-7.

Footnote 613:

iv (vii). 9. 1328b37-41; cf. iii. 5. 1277b33 ff.

Footnote 614:

1329a1; 1330a25-31.

Footnote 615:

1330a25-31; cf. also the pseudo-Econ. i. 2. 1343a26 ff.

Footnote 616:

i. 3. 1260a40 ff.; cf. infra for discussion of this idea.

Footnote 617:

1258b25-27; Rhet. i. 9. 27, 1367a; ἐλευθέρον γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν. His entire argument for the slave as a mere “instrument” (cf. infra) shows the same attitude. Stewart (op. cit., II, 316) says that he failed to see that labor is “an essential function of the social organism, something καλόν and not merely ἁναγκαῖον.”

Footnote 618:

Pol. iv (vii). 4. 1326a22-24.

Footnote 619:

1328b19-23; vi (iv). 1291a1-3.

Footnote 620:

1329a1; i. 11. 1258b38 f.

Footnote 621:

v (viii). 2. 1337b15-22, especially 17 f.: ἔχει δὲ πολλὴν διαφορὰν καὶ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκεν πράττει τις ἣ μανθάνει.

Footnote 622:

The difference in employments and studies is largely one of method and aim. The most humanizing pursuit becomes ἀνελεύθερον and βάναυσον, if followed to an extreme or with a sordid purpose, merely. Cf. Plato Laws 918B-919C, and the criticism of the superficial method and merely vocational motive in mathematical study (Rep. 525C ff.). Cf. above, p. 33, n. 7, for Ruskin’s idea on this point.

Footnote 623:

Aristotle also has the aristocratic idea of labor as robbing a freeman of his independence, Pol. v (viii). 1337b15-22; Rhet. 1367a, cited on p. 94, n. 9.

Footnote 624:

Pol. iv (vii). 9. 1328b39 ff.; N. Eth. x. 7. 1177b4; cf. Jowett, Ar. Pol., I, 144, cited by Stewart, op. cit., II, 446.

Footnote 625:

Pol. ii 3. 1261b33-38.

Footnote 626:

1325a31-33.

Footnote 627:

1258b12-20.

Footnote 628:

Rhet. ii. 4. 9. 1381a, where the word αὐτουργοί is used; cf. above on Euripides.

Footnote 629:

Cf. above on value, and N. Eth. v. 8-9. 1133a5-18.

Footnote 630:

Pol. vii (vi). 6. 1320a38 ff.; cf. p. 92, n. 6.

Footnote 631:

i. 12. 1259b1 ff.

Footnote 632:

1252b1 ff.; cf. Adam’s note to Rep. 370B; Susemihl and Hicks’s note to Pol. 1252b3, for an exception to the rule (De part. Anim. iv. 6. 11. 683a22). ἀλλ᾽ ὅπου μὴ ἐνδέχεται καταχρῆται τῷ αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλείω ἔργα.

Footnote 633:

Pol. ii 1261a30 f.; N. Eth. v. 5.

Footnote 634:

Pol. 1261a37-39; 1328b ff. Fontpertuis (op. cit., p. 359) accounts for the comparative superficiality of the Greek theory of labor by the fact that their political constitution diminished its importance, but cf. our introduction. Capitalistic employment of free labor was probably not extensive.

Footnote 635:

Cf. above, p. 16, n. 6; p. 17, n. 1.

Footnote 636:

On the theory of the Sophists, cf. above, pp. 16 f. On the Cynics, cf. infra; also Zeller, op. cit., II, 2, 376; Ar. Pol. 1253b20-23. Barker (op. cit., p. 359), who has a very clear and discriminating criticism of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, also states that slavery had been attacked by the “logic of events”—e.g., the enslavement of Athenians in Sicily, and the freeing of Messenian Helots, during the Theban supremacy, by which Greek freemen had become slaves and Greek slaves had become free. Cf. Pol. 1255a ff., especially 17 f. and 21-23, for the two theories.

Footnote 637:

The locus classicus for his theory is Pol. i. 4-7. 1253b14 ff.; 13. 1259b21 ff. For good criticisms, cf. Wallon, Histoire de l’esclavage dans l’antiquité, 2d ed., pp. 372 ff.; and Barker, op. cit., 1. Cf. also Newman, op. cit., I, 143 ff.

Footnote 638:

Pol. i. 8. 1256b36; 1253b32.

Footnote 639:

Ibid. 33-39. Aristotle would have been satisfied with electricity.

Footnote 640:

1254a8, cited on p. 88, n. 10. This relieves the severity of the doctrine, since it shows that he thinks chiefly of domestic slavery. But in his proposed state, all industry is manned by slaves. Cf. iv (vii). 1330a25-31.

Footnote 641:

Pol. 1254a9-13; cf. Eud. Eth. 1241b17-24.

Footnote 642:

1254a13-17.

Footnote 643:

Op. cit., p. 362.

Footnote 644:

1254a28-31; 1254b15. As Wallon (op. cit., p. 391) points out, his radical error is a constant confusion of hypothesis with reality.

Footnote 645:

1254a23-24.

Footnote 646:

Ibid. 33 f.

Footnote 647:

Ibid. 30-40; 1254b10-13; 1253b7; 18 f., cf. Eud. Eth. 1241b17 ff.

Footnote 648:

1254b16-19.

Footnote 649:

Ibid. 20-26.

Footnote 650:

Ibid. 26 ff.

Footnote 651:

1254a21 f.

Footnote 652:

1254b6-10; 11 f.; 16-20; 1255b6-15; a doctrine emphasized by Plato, Rep. 590D; Laws 645B, 714A, 818A, 684C, as also by Carlyle and Ruskin; cf. Shorey, Class. Phil., IX (1914), 355 ff. Though Ruskin believed that natural slavery was the inevitable lot of many men, he did not uphold negro slavery, Mun. Pul., v, 133 (Vol. XVII, 256 f.); Time and Tide, p. 149 (Vol. XVII, 438). But he pointed to the white economic slavery as equally bad, Stones of Venice, II (Vol. X, 193); Time and Tide, p. 105 (Vol. XVII, 403); Crown of Wild Olive, 119; Cestus Aglaia, p. 55.

Footnote 653:

1254b32-34; 1255b5 ff.

Footnote 654:

1254b38 f.

Footnote 655:

1255a3-7.

Footnote 656:

Ibid. 19-21 and next note.

Footnote 657:

Ibid. 24 f.

Footnote 658:

Ibid. 25 f.: καὶ τὸν ἀνάξιον δουλεύειν οὐδαμῶς ἂν φαίη τις δοῦλον εἶναι.

Footnote 659:

Ibid. 26-28.

Footnote 660:

Ibid. 33 ff.

Footnote 661:

1255b20-22. Barker (op. cit., p. 369, n. 1) well observes that this is a challenge of the right of slavery, not an argument for it, and that it may have impressed his contemporaries so. Cf. Ruskin: “So there is only one way to have good servants; that is to be worthy of being well served.” (Letters on Servants and Houses, Vol. XVII, 5-18, App. V); cf. also pp. 520 ff.

Footnote 662:

1259b26-28.

Footnote 663:

Ibid. 36-38.

Footnote 664:

Ibid. 39-41.

Footnote 665:

1260a2-4; 14-16; cf. 33 ff., which sets a limit on the slave’s virtue.

Footnote 666:

1260a39-42; 1260b2 f. Cf. Ruskin, Fors Clav., III, Letter 28, 14, on the virtue of the “menial” condition.

Footnote 667:

Cf. Barker, op. cit., p. 370.

Footnote 668:

N. Eth. 1161b1-10, especially 5: ᾗ μὲν οῦν δοῦλος, οὔκ ἐστι φιλία πρὸς αὐτόν, ᾗ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος.

Footnote 669:

Cf. his reference to Cleisthenes’ gift of Athenian citizenship to many slaves; also his own emancipation, by will, of five of his own slaves (Diog. L. V. 1. 9).

Footnote 670:

Cf. Barker, op. cit., p. 370.

Footnote 671:

Sesame and Lilies, end of lecture on “Kings’ Treasuries”; cf. Fors Clav., VII, 9 (Vol. XXIX, 230); Mun. Pul., 130, note; cf. Fors Clav., III (Vol. XXVII, 515 f.). Lett. 28, 13 ff., on the workman as a serf.

Footnote 672:

Barker, op. cit., 368.

Footnote 673:

On the servile condition of the modern laborer, cf. Ruskin as above; a common idea also of Carlyle and of many modern economic writings.

Footnote 674:

Pol. 1257a31 ff., praised for its exactness and insight. Cf. Poehlmann, op. cit., I, 585; Dühring (op. cit., p. 23) belittles it. Newman (op. cit., II, 184) points to ξενικωτέρας as implying that the increased distance between buyers and sellers also caused the origin of money.

Footnote 675:

N. Eth. v. 5. 1133b26-28.

Footnote 676:

Pol. 1257a31-36; ξενικωτέρας γὰρ γενομένης τῆς βοηθείας τῷ εἰσάγεσθαι ὦν ἐνδεεῖς καὶ ἐκπέμπειν ὦν ἐπλεόναζον, ἐξ ἀνάνκης ἡ τοῦ νομίσματος ἐπορίσθη χρῆσις, etc.

Footnote 677:

Ibid. 36-38; εὐμεταχείριστον could mean “malleability,” but probably not, since he considers coinage to be an afterthought.

Footnote 678:

Ibid. 38 f.

Footnote 679:

Ibid. 39-41.

Footnote 680:

1257b1-5.

Footnote 681:

As a symbol of exchange (ξύμβολον τῆς ἀλλαγῆς) it is a medium of exchange and a measure of value (Rep. 371B; Laws 742A-B, 918B).

Footnote 682:

v. 8. 1133a18-1133b28.

Footnote 683:

1133a29.

Footnote 684:

Ibid. 5-19; 25; 27 f.; 1133b10, etc.

Footnote 685:

1133a19-22, 25 f.; 1133b16; 22; ix. 1164a1 f.; Pol. 1258b1-5, μεταβολῆς χάριν; 1257a30 ff. Stewart (op. cit., I, 416 ff.) thinks that the author meant to apply the corrective (διορθωτικόν) function of justice also to money, in that it makes exchange more fair and uniform. As evidence, he points to N. Eth. 1131a18 ff. and 1133a19-22, where the functions of justice and money are defined in similar terms. Cf. also his interesting remarks on the dianemetic function, which prompts exchange and distribution.

Footnote 686:

1133b10-13.

Footnote 687:

Ibid. 15-18: οὔτε γὰρ ἂν μὴ οὔσης αλλαγῆς κοινωνία ἦν, etc.

Footnote 688:

Pol. 1257b8 f.

Footnote 689:

1257b10-18; for the theory of the Cynics, cf. infra, especially on Eryxias. Cf. Newman, op. cit., II, 188, note, and his reference to Macaulay’s note on the margin of his edition of the Politics.

Footnote 690:

1257b19 ff.; cf. the transitional sentence, 18, a slight hint that he accepts the theory.

Footnote 691:

N. Eth. v. 5. 1133a29-31; cf. 1133b20 f., ἐξ ὑποθέσεως, cf. infra, where the pseudo-Economica takes it for granted.

Footnote 692:

Pol. 1257a36 f., cited on p. 102.

Footnote 693:

N. Eth. v. 5. 1133b13 f.: οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσον δύναται· ὅμως δὲ βούλεται μένειν μᾶλλον.

Footnote 694:

Cf. p. 86, n. 1, for passages.

Footnote 695:

Blanqui (op. cit., pp. 36, 88), Ingram (op. cit., p. 18), DuBois (op. cit., p. 51 and n. 1), Zmavc (Zeitschr. f. d. ges. Staatswiss. , pp. 76 f.), Palgrave’s Dictionary (art. “Aristotle,” p. 54), all admit this conclusion. Barker (op. cit., p. 380) says that the idea is hinted at. Souchon (op. cit., pp. 110 f.) accepts the other view, stating that this was his purpose, to show the folly of making merely imaginary goods the goal of all life.

Footnote 696:

Cf. N. Eth. v. 5. 1133b13 f.

Footnote 697:

Pol. 1257b5-8, and the whole of 1257b; 1258b1-5.

Footnote 698:

1258b25.

Footnote 699:

N. Eth. 1121b34: καὶ τοκισταὶ κατὰ μικρὰ καὶ ἐπὶ πολλῷ. Cf. Zell’s translation.

Footnote 700:

Pol. 1258b1-8; but cf. p. 39 on this point. The etymology should not be taken seriously. Ruskin cites Aristotle on this point. Cf. above, p. 39, n. 10.

Footnote 701:

Cf. Barker, op. cit., p. 385 and n. 2, where he criticizes Poehlmann for his idea that Aristotle “is attacking a great credit system,” and “is enunciating a gospel of socialism.” But cf. infra.

Footnote 702:

Pol. 1257b5 ff.

Footnote 703:

Ibid. 33 ff.; for further discussion of chrematistik, cf. infra.

Footnote 704:

Cf. Haney, op. cit., p. 49: “In Athens, the circulation of capital was inconsiderable, and money was not lent for productive purposes as often as for the purpose of relieving distress”; Souchon, op. cit., p. 93, though (pp. 106 f.) he recognizes the other side.

Footnote 705:

Cf. Paley and Sandys ed., especially Or. xxxvi; Isoc. Trapeziticus; Boeckh, op. cit., I, 160 ff.; V. Brants, “Les operations de banque dans la Grèce antique,” Le Muséon, I, 2, 196-203; Koutorga, Le trapézites, (Paris, 1859); cf. also E. Meyer, Kleine Schriften.

Footnote 706:

Or. xx. 25.

Footnote 707:

Or. xxxvi. 44: εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀγνοεῖς, ὅτι πίστις ἀφορμὴ τῶν πασῶν ἐστὶ μεγίστη πρὸς χρηματισμόν, πᾶν ἂν ἀγνοήσειας.

Footnote 708:

Ibid. 57 ff.

Footnote 709:

Cf. p. 105, n. 7, on Souchon; E. Boehm von Bawerk (Capital und Capitalzins, I, 17 f.) says: “Die Geschäftsleute und Praktiker standen sicher auf der zinsfreundlichen Seite.” He accounts for the fact that almost the only passages against interest are in the philosophers by the inference that to uphold interest was superfluous, and to oppose it was useless. Poehlmann exaggerates both the degree of credit operations, and the prejudice of Aristotle.

Footnote 710:

For the Greek terms, cf. p. 40.

Footnote 711:

Pol. 1257a15-17.

Footnote 712:

Ibid. 22-28; N. Eth. v. 5. 1133b26-28.

Footnote 713:

Pol. 1257a30 ff. These two periods of οἰκονομική and χρηματιστική correspond well to the German terms Naturalwirtschaft and Geldwirtschaft. Kautz (op. cit., p. 137, n. 4) says that this antithesis was about as dear to Aristotle as it is to moderns. For the terms, cf. infra.

Footnote 714:

N. Eth. v. 4. 1132b11-1133b28; cf. also under value and money, above; cf. Mag. mor. i. 33. 1193b19 ff.

Footnote 715:

1132b11-20; cf. Rep. 369B-C; 370B, for a similar idea of Plato.

Footnote 716:

1132b33.

Footnote 717:

Ibid. 32-34, especially τῷ ἀντιποιεῖν ἀνάλογον συμμένει ἡ πίλις; 17 f.; Stewart, op. cit., I, 449.

Footnote 718:

1133a5-10, cited on p. 83, nn. 2-7; cf. Eud. Eth. vii. 10. 1243b28-38.

Footnote 719:

1133a10 f.

Footnote 720:

Cf. p. 83, n. 7. The less valuable product must make up in quantity what it lacks in quality. The proportion thus becomes, γεωργός : σκυτοτόμος : : x pairs of shoes : a quantity of grain of equal value (1133a32 f.). Cf. other methods of statement, 1133b4 f., 22 Stewart, op. cit., I, 453 f.

Footnote 721:

1133b1-4.

Footnote 722:

1133a11 f.; 16-18: ἑτέρων καὶ οὐκ ἴσων. Cf. Rep. 369C, 370B; Ar. Pol. 1261a22 for a similar idea. Stewart (op. cit., I, 464 f.), following Jackson, interprets, on the basis of 1132a33, the buyer’s two advantages to be, if he buys too cheaply, the part of the article still unpaid for, and the money he should have paid for it. Cf. ibid. pp. 455-67 for other interpretations.

Footnote 723:

1133a15 f.: ἀνῃροῦντο γὰρ ἄν, εἰ μὴ ὁ ἐποίει τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅσον καὶ οἷον, καὶ τὸ πάσχειν ἔπασχε τοῦτο και τοσοῦτον καὶ τοιοῦτον. I follow Jackson, note, pp. 97 f.; Rassow, Forsch., p. 18 (Peters’ trans., p. 154, n. 2), in accepting this difficult passage as an integral part of its context, and in interpreting it as above, though aside from the context, it would hardly bear this meaning. Stewart (op. cit., I, 455 ff.) thinks it is an interpolation or note, referring merely to the mechanical fact in the arts that material is receptive to the impression.

Footnote 724:

1133a18 f.; 25-28; 1133b6-8; 19 f.; cf. Rep. 369C.

Footnote 725:

1133a19-29; cf. Stewart’s excellent comments, op. cit., I, 459 ff.

Footnote 726:

1133b14-16; 20-22: τοῦτο γὰρ πάντα ποιεῖ σύμμετρα; e.g., if a house is equal to five minae and a bed is worth one, five beds equal one house (23-26).

Footnote 727:

Handwörterbuch der Staatswwissenschaft, art. “Geld,” 2d ed., Bd. IV, 82 f.

Footnote 728:

Op. cit., p. 384.

Footnote 729:

Cf. citations above, p. 42, n. 7, and p. 44, n. 2. Cf. DuBois, op. cit., p. 46.

Footnote 730:

Cf. Haney, op. cit., p. 48.

Footnote 731:

Pol. 1259a2 f.; 33-35.

Footnote 732:

iv (vii). 6. 1327a25-30.

Footnote 733:

Rhet. i. 4. 7: περὶ τῶν εἰσαγομένων καὶ ἐξαγομένων, as among the subjects for a statesman’s consideration; cf. also 11.

Footnote 734:

Pp. 89 and notes.

Footnote 735:

Pol. 1257a28-30; vi (iv). 4. 1291a4-6; 1291b19 f.; vii (vi). 7. 1321a6, all seem to take retail and wholesale trade in the state for granted. But it is not named in the list of necessary callings in the ideal state, 1328b24 ff.; 5 ff.; cf. also 1329a40 ff. Of course the citizens are not to engage in it (1328b37 ff.).

Footnote 736:

N. Eth. v. 8. 1132b4 f.; 1133a27; all of chap. 8; cf. above, on just exchange.

Footnote 737:

Pol. iv (vii). 6. 1327a25-28.

Footnote 738:

vii (vi). 5. 1320a39: ἀφορμὴν ἐμπορίας. Cf. p. 96.

Footnote 739:

Cf. discussion above of just exchange.

Footnote 740:

Pol. i. chaps. 8-11. Ruskin does not seem to have used the term “chrematistik,” and he has no reference to this passage, though, as seen above, he has much to say in the same general spirit.

Footnote 741:

Pol. 1256a11 f.; cf. p. 40 on Plato’s terms for trade. For the word χρηματιστική, cf. Rep. 415E, contrasted to soldiers; Gorg. 477E, the art that frees from poverty; 452C; Euthyd. 304C, of the Sophists; Xen. Econ. ii. 18, where no prejudice is implied.

Footnote 742:

Pol. i. 8. 1256a10-12; but cf. N. Eth. i. 1. 1094a9: τέλος οἰκονομικῆς δὲ πλοῦτος; and Pol. iii. 4. 1277b24 f.: ἐπεὶ καὶ οἰκονομία ἑτέρα ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός· τοῦ μὲν γὰρ κτᾶσθαι τῆς δὲ φυλάττειν ἔργον ἐστίν. An American economist would hardly make the latter distinction. Newman (op. cit., II, 166) thinks that in these two passages he states the actual condition, but cf. infra, where Aristotle admits a degree of acquisition in domestic economy.

Footnote 743:

1256a15 ff.

Footnote 744:

1256b26-39.

Footnote 745:

Ibid. 30-37; cf. above on the definition of wealth.

Footnote 746:

1258a19 ff. He would combat the common idea that the first business of economics is to provide unlimited revenue (1259a35; 1254a1 f.)

Footnote 747:

1256b40-42; 1257a4 f.; 17 f.; cf. Eud. Eth. iii. 4. 1232a6-9.

Footnote 748:

1257b1 f.; 9 f.

Footnote 749:

1257a18 f., 28-30; 1257b19 f.; 31 ff.

Footnote 750:

1257a31 ff. Poehlmann (op. cit., I, 599) cites Schaeffle, Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers, I, 256, that this analysis of the change from natural to capitalistic economy holds “im Kern die ganze moderne Kritik des Kapitals,” but the standpoint of the two is essentially different.

Footnote 751:

1258a1-14. Extreme desire demands superfluity (ὑπερβολή).

Footnote 752:

1257b20 f.

Footnote 753:

Ibid. 23 ff.

Footnote 754:

Ibid. 35 f. The two uses overlap (ἐπαλλάττει).

Footnote 755:

Ibid. 36-39.

Footnote 756:

1258a16-18.

Footnote 757:

Ibid. 19 ff. The other function is secondary (ὑπερετική).

Footnote 758:

Ibid. 39 f.

Footnote 759:

Ibid. 37 f.

Footnote 760:

1258b12-21.

Footnote 761:

Ibid. 1 f.; cf. 1256a40 ff., where καπηλεία is opposed to αὐτόφυτον ἔχουσι τὴν ἐργασίαν.

Footnote 762:

1258b20-23.

Footnote 763:

Ibid. 25-27. This contrasted yet overlapping relation between the two kinds of finance is well represented by Haney, op. cit., 46. Cf. also Ashley, op. cit., p. 340, for a synopsis of the divisions of κτητική.

Footnote 764:

1258b27-33.

Footnote 765:

Op. cit., pp. 333 ff., more satisfactory than Jowett’s idea that the intermediateness consists either in exchange for money of the direct products of the earth, or else that wood-cutting and mining are themselves the intermediate form; or than Newman’s (op. cit., II, 202 f.) theory that it consists in the fact that in this type wealth is sought, not from fruits or animals, but from things, just as exchange seeks wealth from other men or from money, as Ashley shows. However, two questions still remain unanswered: why Aristotle has three forms in chap. 11 and only two elsewhere; and why the terms, ἀκάρπων, wood-cutting, and mining are so prominent, if their relation to the thought is only incidental.

Footnote 766:

Pol. iv (vii). 1328b39 ff.; 1327a29-31.

Footnote 767:

This was a common Greek feeling (Dem. xxv. 46).

Footnote 768:

But he seems to recognize it elsewhere (N. Eth. v. 8).

Footnote 769:

Cf. DuBois, op. cit., p. 48.

Footnote 770:

Cf. the entire criticism of chrematistik, and especially 1257b40-42, the contrast between ζῆν and εὐ ζῆν. On this point, cf. above, pp. 109 f. and 87 ff. Zmavc (Zeitschrift, etc., p. 52), rightly states that even Adam Smith made his economic theory a subordinate part of his practical philosophy.

Footnote 771:

An unfair criticism, as seen above.

Footnote 772:

Pol. 1266b8-14; iv (vii). 1335b22 ff.

Footnote 773:

1265b6-12.

Footnote 774:

1270a40 ff.

Footnote 775:

Cf. iv (vii). 4. 1326a25-30, especially, τῶν γοῦν δοκουσῶν πολιτεύεσθαι καλῶς οὐδεμίαν ὁρῶμεν οὖσαν ἀνειμένην πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος. Cf. entire chapter.

Footnote 776:

1130b ff.; cf. under value, money, and exchange. The terms are διανομή or ἡ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή.

Footnote 777:

1131a11.

Footnote 778:

Ibid. 21: καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται ἱσότης, οἷς καὶ ἐν οἶς. Cf. above, pp. 55 f. and 60 f., on Plato’s idea of equality; cf. infra for further comments on Aristotle.

Footnote 779:

1132b32 f.; cf. pp. 107 ff. and notes for a more detailed discussion, and for Greek expressions.

Footnote 780:

1131b27-32: ἡ διανομὴ ἔσται κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν αὐτὸν ὅνπερ ἔχουσι πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ εἰσενεχθέντα. Cf. Mag. mor. i. 33. 1193b36 ff. Stewart (op. cit., I, 432) says that the expression ἡ τῶν κοινῶν διανομή must mean more than distribution by some central authority, for the most important form of it is the distribution of wealth, operating under economic laws that regulate wages and profits.

Footnote 781:

1131a24-26.

Footnote 782:

Ibid. 22-24. For Plato, cf. pp. 55 f.

Footnote 783:

Ibid. 26-29.

Footnote 784:

Ibid.; Pol. iii. 1280a7 ff.; 1282b23 ff.

Footnote 785:

Cf. above, pp. 113, and 93 ff. on labor.

Footnote 786:

Pol. ii. 4. 1262b2 f.

Footnote 787:

1264a11-17; 36-38; 1264b11-13, all discussed above under Plato.

Footnote 788:

iv (vii). 1329b41 ff.

Footnote 789:

1271a29-37; 1272a12-21.

Footnote 790:

N. Eth. v. chaps. 4-5, discussed above.

Footnote 791:

Pol. vi (iv). 1295b35 ff.

Footnote 792:

v (vi). 1320a33 ff.; cf. pp. 95 f.; cf. especially 35: τεχναστέον οὖν ὅπως, ἂν εὐπορία γένοιτο χρόνιος, and 1267b3 ff. on the insatiety of the masses. He believed that the state doles for mere consumption aggravated the evil—a very sane doctrine which our city charity organizations are prone to overlook.

Footnote 793:

Cf. Poehlmann, op. cit., II, 339 f., on this passage.

Footnote 794:

Cf. above, n. 4 above, and pp. 95 f.

Footnote 795:

1320a36: ἐπεὶ δὲ συμφέρει τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς εὐπόροις, and 34, τοῦτο γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ μοχθηρὰν εἶναι τὴν δημοκρατίαν; viz., undue poverty of the masses.

Footnote 796:

Op. cit., p. 7; cf. Poehlmann, op. cit., I, 600, on this point.

Footnote 797:

Pol. ii. 7. 1266b14-25, as advocated by Phaleas; cf. above. Cf. infra for Aristotle’s advocacy of equality in landed property.

Footnote 798:

1267a37-39.

Footnote 799:

Ibid. 39-41.

Footnote 800:

1267b1-4; vii (vi). 1320a31; cf. p. 117 on this idea. He does not consider the rise in the cost of living.

Footnote 801:

1266b28-30.

Footnote 802:

Cf. Bonar, op. cit., p. 45.

Footnote 803:

Aristotle, like Plato, strongly emphasizes education as a great cure for the ills of the state (1310a15 ff.). It should be common to all citizens, and be publicly supervised (1336a22 ff.).

Footnote 804:

1267a13-17.

Footnote 805:

1266b38-1267a2.

Footnote 806:

Ecclesiazusae. Poehlmann (op. cit., I, 403) argues that such ideas were widespread in Greece.

Footnote 807:

Pol. iii. 9. 1280a14-21: σχεδὸν δ᾽ οἱ πλεῖστοι φαῦλοι κριταὶ περὶ τῶν οἰκείων. Cf. 7-31, his discriminating remarks on equality in general.

Footnote 808:

vii (vi). 5; iii. 10; cf. Haney op. cit., p. 45.

Footnote 809:

Cf. above on fair exchange; also p. 116 and notes.

Footnote 810:

vi (iv). 4. 1292a4-38.

Footnote 811:

vii (vi). 3. 1318b1-5, especially οἱ δὲ κρατοῦντες οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν; cf. iii. 9. 1280a, especially 22-30, on the false idea of equality on both sides.

Footnote 812:

i. 1: ζῷον πολιτικόν; 1280a31 ff.; 1252b30 f.; cf. all of chap. 9 to 1281a10.

Footnote 813:

1280b10-12, against Lycophron; cf., above, p. 16; καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη καὶ ... ἐγγυητὴς ἀλλήλοις τῶν δικαίων, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ οἵος ποιεῖν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ δικαίους τοὺς πολίτας.

Footnote 814:

Op. cit., II, 304.

Footnote 815:

Pol. v (viii). 1. 1337a27-30, a remarkable passage, suggestive of Plato and of St. Paul’s analogy of the body. Aristotle paints vividly the antithesis between political and economic equality, whereby there grows up a state within a state (1295b13 ff.), for he believes with the author of Eud. Eth. vii. 10. 1242a, that man is not only a πολιτικόν, but also an οἰκονομικόν ζῷον. Cl. Poehlmann, op. cit., I, 276 ff.

Footnote 816:

1266b8-14; 1265a38-42; unfair to Plato, as seen above.

Footnote 817:

1266b24-28; 1265a28-38.

Footnote 818:

1265b22 ff.

Footnote 819:

1267b9-13.

Footnote 820:

Cf. his criticism of the Spartan system, 1270a40 ff.

Footnote 821:

On its wisdom, cf. infra; on its feasibility, cf. 1263b29: πάμπαν ἀδύνατος.

Footnote 822:

1261a16-1261b15.

Footnote 823:

1261b30-32; 24-28.

Footnote 824:

32-35.

Footnote 825:

1262b4-24.

Footnote 826:

22-24.

Footnote 827:

1262a40-1262b3.

Footnote 828:

1263b30 ff., and preceding note.

Footnote 829:

1263a11-16.

Footnote 830:

22-26; 39 f.

Footnote 831:

26-30, citing the proverb κοινὰ τὰ φίλων. Cf. 1329b14 ff. N. Eth. viii; 8 f. on φιλία; Pol. 1252b29; 1280a25; cf. Xen. Laced. Pol. vi. 3-4.

Footnote 832:

Cf. preceding note, and 1261b32 ff.

Footnote 833:

1261a30 f. N. Eth. v. 5.

Footnote 834:

1263b22 f.

Footnote 835:

37-42. But Plato used both methods.

Footnote 836:

1263b27-29; e.g., besides the personal satisfaction (1263a40 f.), the opportunity for liberality (1263b11-13).

Footnote 837:

iv (vii). 10. 1330a5 ff. He would make part of the land public. In the Laws, the expense is met by making the product public.

Footnote 838:

1271a29-37.

Footnote 839:

Ibid. 28 f.; 1272a12-21.

Footnote 840:

Cf. above on socialism in the Laws.

Footnote 841:

Pol. ii. 1270a21 f.; viii (v). 1309a23-25, though rather a measure for an oligarchy; vii (vi). 1319a8-13, for a democracy, also against mortgage on land; cf. Guiraud, La Prop. fonc., p. 591. Like Plato, he opposes free disposal of dowries (1270a23-25).

Footnote 842:

Cf. p. 122, n. 1.

Footnote 843:

1330a9-23.

Footnote 844:

1265b24-26.

Footnote 845:

iv (vii). 1329a18-21.

Footnote 846:

1330a25-31; 1328b40; 1329a2; cf. Souchon, op. cit., pp. 169 f., on his system as compared with that of the Laws.

Footnote 847:

Cf. p. 120, n. 5; but cf. viii (v). 1308b16-19 for a recognition of the desirability of such a regulation.

Footnote 848:

Cf. above, his criticism of chrematistik, Pol. i. chaps. 8-10.

Footnote 849:

So Souchon, op. cit., p. 167; cf. above for differences in detail.

Footnote 850:

Cf. pp. 119 f.; 1280b35 ff. He does not overlook the complement of this principle, that the prosperity of the whole involves that of the parts (iv . 1328b37 ff.; 1329a18-21), his unjust criticism of Plato on this point. Zmavc (Zeitschrift, etc., p. 56, n. 3) rightly observes that there is more truth in this Greek doctrine of the relation of the individual to the state than moderns are prone to recognize.

Footnote 851:

Op. cit., p. 391.

Footnote 852:

Francotte (L’Industrie, II, 250) strongly emphasizes their extreme limitation of the individual. Souchon (op. cit., p. 170) refers to them as precursors of Marx, though he recognizes the difference in their aim.