CHAPTER II

ECONOMIC IDEAS BEFORE PLATO, AND REASONS FOR THE UNDEVELOPED CHARACTER OF GREEK ECONOMICS

As stated above, the economic ideas of the Greeks were unsystematized and inextensive. The extant literature previous to Plato presents only incidental hints on matters economic. Hesiod, in interesting antithesis to classical thinkers, emphasizes the dignity and importance of manual labor. The contrast, however, is not so great as it appears, for the labor which he dignifies is agricultural. He constantly urges its importance as the chief source of wealth. On the other hand, he opposes the commercial spirit that was beginning to be rife in his age, and decries the evil of unjust gains. His mention of the fact of competition between artisans of the same trade is of interest for the development of industry in Greece. His Erga was, in a sense, the forerunner of the later Economica in Greek literature.

Solon proved by his reforms that he had some sane economic ideas as to the importance of labor, industry, commerce, and money in the development of the state. He also showed some insight into the solution of the problem of poverty. His ideas, however, are not definitely formulated in his extant fragments, and belong rather to economic history. The Elegies of Theognis are full of moral utterances on wealth, emphasizing its temporary nature as compared with virtue. Pythagoras and his followers have often been given a prominent place in the history of communism, but this is probably due to a false interpretation. It is likely, however, that he opposed the evils of luxury, and moralized on the relation between wealth and virtue. Democritus wrote a work on agriculture. Like the other philosophers, he taught that happiness was to be sought in the gold of character, rather than in material wealth. To his mind, poverty and wealth alike were but names for need and satiety (κόρου). Wealth without understanding was not a safe possession, depending for its value on right use. The amassing of wealth by just means, however, was good, though unjust gains were always a source of evil. Excessive desire for wealth was worse than the most extreme poverty. It is possible also that Democritus held to a mild form of the social contract theory of the origin of society. Heraclitus complained bitterly of the unwisdom of the masses and their merely material view of life. He made the common antithesis between material and spiritual wealth, and observed the fact that gold is a universal medium of exchange. Hippodamas of Miletus and Phaleas of Chalcedon proposed new plans for the distribution of wealth, but we have the barest outline of their theories from Aristotle. Their systems will be discussed in a following chapter.

The Sophists, true to their character as philosophers of extreme individualism, developed a new theory of the origin of society. The already current term φύσις, “nature,” which had been accepted as a sufficient reason for the state’s existence, was now opposed to “law,” νόμος, as natural to artificial. The Sophists argued that, in a primitive state of nature, perfect individualism was the rule. Men did injustice without restraint. The weaker, however, being in the majority, and finding it to their disadvantage to compete with the strong, agreed neither to do nor to suffer injustice, and constrained the stronger minority to co-operate in their decision. Thus arose the social contract whereby nature gave up its real instinct for an artificial convention (συνθήκη), and thus society came into being. The theory, at first, though untrue, was not intended to be destructive of moral foundations, but was opposed rather to the traditional idea of the laws of a state as the “decrees of a divinely inspired lawgiver.” In the hands of men like Thrasymachus and Callicles, however, it became a means of denying that the life according to nature was bound by any laws which the strong need observe, and that might was the only final law.

In line with their radical individualism, the Sophists were also pioneers in the more cosmopolitan spirit that characterized the Cynics and Stoics. They taught the doctrine of the fundamental worth and relationship of men, and thus, with the Cynics, started the attack upon the theory that upheld slavery as a natural institution. Little further is known of their other social or economic ideas. Protagoras wrote a work on “wages,” but it was probably an argument relative to the acceptance of pay by Sophists. In any event, this fact that the Sophists were so ready to be enriched through their lectures is clear evidence that their teaching on wealth was not the negative doctrine of the other Greek philosophers. Prodicus seems to have scorned menial labor as morally degrading, though he agreed with Hesiod in his doctrine of the dignity of all work that is noble. He emphasized the necessity of labor in the production of material good, and, like Democritus, was the forerunner of the Socratics in his insistence upon right use as a criterion of wealth. Hippias prided himself on his accomplishment in many arts, and thus probably did not share the prejudice of the philosophers against manual labor.

Euripides, though markedly individualistic, like the Sophists, shows traces of the older use of nature to explain the necessity of the state. He draws a parallel between the social order and the order of nature, by which law and government are justified, and the right of the middle class of farmers to rule is upheld. He emphasizes the importance of agriculture, and the dignity of the peasant farmer (αὐτουργός), who works his own land, as the stay of the country. This latter accords well with his cosmopolitan spirit, which he shares with the Sophists. He opposes the artificial distinctions of birth, slavery, and the traditional Greek idea of the inferiority of woman. His attitude toward wealth is that of the moral philosopher rather than that of the Sophist.

Thucydides reveals considerable insight into economic problems, though he does not deal with them directly. Roscher declares that the Greek historian contributed as much as any other writer to give him the elements of his science, since he alone, of all Greek writers, did not confuse his economic ideas with ethics. He recognizes the place of labor in production, and the importance of material wealth as the basis for all higher development. He also has some appreciation of the true nature of capital. In his description of the undeveloped condition of early Greece, which lived from hand to mouth, he writes like a modern economist describing primitive conditions in Europe in contrast to the capitalism of his own day. Cornford’s attempt to discredit Thucydides as a historian, and to show that he missed the true cause, economic, of the Peloponnesian War, is not convincing. Cornford both exaggerates the influence of commercial interests in fifth-century Athens and belittles the economic insight of Thucydides. The Greek writer is, however, like Herodotus, a historical source for the actual economic conditions in Greece, rather than an economic theorist.

Aside from the fragmentary hints presented above, Greek economic thought begins with the Socratics, Plato, Xenophon, and Aristotle, and is continued, in a very incidental way, in the orators, and in the Stoics and their contemporaries. As we shall see, however, even in the Socratics, no real science of wealth is developed, in the modern sense. The reason for this lack, which is most commonly emphasized since it is closest at hand, is that the phenomena of actual production were but slightly developed. This explanation is well summarized by Haney as follows: (a) that economic relations between individuals and states were far simpler than now; (b) that international commerce was not encouraged by ancient states, whose ideal was rather national exclusion; (c) that public finance was then very limited and unimportant; (d) that division of labor was not extensive; (e) that the relative lack of security of life and property discouraged exchange and saving; (f) that in all these respects, the situation is analogous to that of mediaeval Europe.

There is certainly much force in this general reason. The development of economic thought must, of course, depend upon the actual conditions under which the thinkers live. We have already admitted also the vast difference between the present economic complexity and the simplicity in ancient Greece. The foregoing summary of Haney, however, is misleading. Though the ideal of Sparta was national exclusion, it was surely not that of Athens and some other Greek states. All extant records agree that Athens, at least, the home of the economic theorists, encouraged international commerce by every means in her power. The division of labor, while insignificant compared with the minute division of modern mechanical industry, was by no means inextensive, as is evidenced by the fact that this is a point on which Greek thinkers show especial insight. The notion that Greek industry was chiefly limited to household economy, and that the era of capitalism had not yet dawned, has long ago been refuted by Meyer and others. The alleged insecurity of life and property, while relatively true, is exaggerated for Athens, at least. Above all, the common attempt to draw an analogy between classical Greece and mediaeval Europe economically is due to an utter misconception. The period of Greek economic history, which corresponds to that of the Middle Ages, is rather the era of economic awakening, between the middle of the ninth and the end of the sixth century B.C.

Other reasons for the limited development of Greek economic thought are:

a) The dominance of the state over the individual citizen, which fact caused political rather than economic speculation to absorb the attention of Greek thinkers. It is stated that the importance of the individual must be recognized before a science of economics can develop. This reason is also usually overemphasized.

b) The general prejudice in Greece against industry, labor for another, and finance for its own sake. That such a prejudice existed to some degree, arising from the old aristocratic feeling, moral objections, the reflex influence of slavery, the spirit of independence, and the belief that leisure was necessary for the proper performance of the duties of citizenship, is generally admitted. The commonly assumed universality of this feeling is, however, open to grave question. The prejudice against skilled labor was probably limited to the moral philosophers, and perhaps to the more aristocratic portion of the citizens, and we shall see in another chapter that the hostile attitude of the philosophers themselves has been considerably exaggerated. The evil effects of slavery also could not have been so marked in Greece, before the age of machinery. Moreover, as Meyer has pointed out, a prejudice against manual labor is evident among the more favored classes in most European countries today, yet it does not appear to retard the advance of industry in the least.

c) The approval of conquest as a legitimate source of wealth. This is somewhat true as applied to the state, but it certainly is irrelevant for the individual citizen of fifth-century Athens. To appeal to Aristotle’s list of legitimate employments as evidence of this is to misinterpret his meaning, for he is thinking of a primitive life, not of contemporary Greece.

d) Economic facts are a commonplace of daily life, and familiarity breeds contempt. This statement contradicts the first reason given by Haney. Moreover, it is somewhat unfortunate as applied to Greece, since the very opposite reason is given for the prominence of political speculation—the commonness of practical politics.

e) Perhaps the strongest reason for the comparative unimportance of Greek economic thought is usually not emphasized. It is the patent fact that almost our only extant sources are the Socratic philosophers, who represent avowedly a direct moral reaction against the commercial spirit and money-greed of their age. Thus the limited development of Greek economics, so far from being an evidence of primitive economic conditions in Greece, is a direct argument for the opposite. To be sure, a man with the scientific mind of Aristotle would scarcely have failed to gain a clearer apprehension of certain fundamentals of economics than he did, had his economic environment been more complex. Yet the fact remains that he and Plato are moral prophets, protesting against that very capitalism whose existence many modern historians have sought to deny to their age.

Footnote 18:

Cf. infra for qualifications. Zimmern (op. cit., p. 227) rightly insists: “In spite of what is often said, Greece did produce economists.”

Footnote 19:

Erga 308, 314, 397 f., 311 (ἔργον δ᾽ οὐδὲν ὄνειδος, ἀεργίη δέ τ᾽ ὄνειδος), 310, 303-6, 413. Any material in Homer applies rather to a history of economic conditions. Cf., however, Il. xiii. 730-32; iii. 65; xxiii. 667 on specialization of gifts.

Footnote 20:

Cf. Erga and Theogony 969-75; cf. n. 2.

Footnote 21:

Cf. n. 2 above; a common theme of seventh- and eighth-century poets; cf. e.g., Sappho (Bergk-Hiller, Lyr. G. Vet. , I, 204, fr. 79 ); ὁ πλοῦτος ἄνευ τὰς ἀρετὰς οὐκ ἀσίνης πάροικος. Cf. also III, 168, fr. 49 (50), Alcaeus.

Footnote 22:

Erga 25 f.

Footnote 23:

Cf. his poems, especially fr. xiii. 43 ff.; Ar. Ath. Pol. x. 1; Plut. Solon 15, 22-24; Kautz, op. cit., pp. 114 f. and note, on Solon and the other lawgivers; Gilliard, Quelque Réformes de Solon. Cornford (Thucydides Mythhistoricus, p. 66) thinks he was “on the verge” of discovering the law that exports must balance imports.

Footnote 24:

Elegies 1117 f., 227 ff., 1157 f., 181 f., 267 ff., 173 ff., 351 ff., 393 ff., 523 ff., 621 f., 199 ff., 753, 145 f., 559 f., etc.

Footnote 25:

On this error, cf. infra, on communism before Plato.

Footnote 26:

Cf. Kautz, op. cit., p. 114; Jamblichus, De Pyth. vit., chap. xii, p. 58; chap. xvi, p. 69.

Footnote 27:

Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker (1912), II, 20, 69.

Footnote 28:

Ibid., p. 95, fr. 171; p. 73, fr. 40.

Footnote 29:

Ibid., p. 119, fr. 283.

Footnote 30:

Ibid., p. 77, fr. 77; cf. Stob. Flor. 94. 24; χρημάτων χρῆσις ξὺν νόῳ μὲν χρήσιμον εἰς τὸ ἐλευθέριον εἶναι καί δημοφελέα· ξὺν ἀνοίῃ δὲ χορηγίῃ ξυνή. Cf. Xenophon and Plato, infra, on value and wealth.

Footnote 31:

Ibid., p. 78, fr. 78.

Footnote 32:

Ibid., p. 105, frs. 200, 218, 221.

Footnote 33:

Ibid., fr. 219; p. 106, fr. 224. The ethical fragments of Democritus, cited above, may be spurious. Cf. Mullach, Frag. Phil. Gr., I, 138; Zeller (Gesch. d. Gr. Phil. I, 2, 925, n. 1) leaves the question open. Diels (op. cit., II, 1912) cites the above passages under the “echte fragmente,” though some are starred.

Footnote 34:

Cf. Barker, op. cit., p. 37.

Footnote 35:

Diels, op. cit., I, 83, fr. 29; οἱ δὲ πολλὸι κεκόρηται ὁκώσπερ κτήνεα.

Footnote 36:

Ibid., p. 82, fr. 22; cf. Clem. Alex. Strom. iv. 2. p. 565, and his comment.

Footnote 37:

Diels, op. cit., I, 95, fr. 90: πυρὸς ἀνταμείβεται πάντα καὶ πῦρ ἀπάντων, ὥσπερ χρυσοῦ χρήματα καὶ χρημάτων χρυσὸς.

Footnote 38:

Pol. ii; cf. infra for details.

Footnote 39:

Cf. Glaucon’s tentative argument presenting the Sophist theory, Rep. 358E ff., very similar to that of Hobbes. Cf. Barker’s (op. cit., pp. 27 ff.) excellent presentation of the rise of this theory and its causes.

Footnote 40:

Cf. A. Dobbs, Philosophy and Popular Morals in Ancient Greece (1907), p. 48. For examples, cf. Hippias, cited below, n. 6, or Lycophron, opposed by Aristotle, cited below in Aristotle’s criticism of socialism (Pol. 1280b10-12).

Footnote 41:

Rep. i, and the story of Gyges, Rep. ii.

Footnote 42:

Gorg. 482E ff., though Callicles was hardly a Sophist.

Footnote 43:

E.g., Hippias in Protag. 337C, where he says that men are related (συγγενεῖς, οἰκείους) by nature, not by law, and that the law is a tyrant of men that does much violence contrary to nature (παρὰ τὴν φύσιν).

Footnote 44:

Cf. Alcidamas frag., cited infra on Aristotle’s theory of slavery, and Ar. Pol. i. 3. 1253b20-23; Lycophron (pseudo-Plut. Pro. Nob. 18. 2) denies the reality of the distinction between noble and ill-born. Cf. also on Euripides, infra. On the development of the opposition to slavery in Greece, cf. Newman, Pol. of Arist., I, 139 ff.

Footnote 45:

Diog. L. ix. 55: δίκη ὑπὲρ μισθοῦ. Cf. Diels, op. cit., II, 220, 231; Croiset, Hist. de la Litt. Gr., IV, 54. Souchon (op. cit., p. 23, n. 1) thinks that it may have taught the dignity of all labor. Cf. also Plato (Sophist 232 D): τὰ πρωταγόρεια ... περί τε πάλης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν. Gomperz (Die Apologie der Heilkunst, p. 33) infers that Protagoras had published a Gesammtapologie der Künste. Cf. Pol. 299C, and Diog. L. ix. 8. 55.

Footnote 46:

Cf. Plato Protag. 328B, where Protagoras states his rule as to charges for his lectures. Cf. Zeller, op. cit., I, 2, 1080 ff., on the earnings of the Sophists. Cf. Plato Euthyd. 304C: ὅτι οὐδὲ τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαί φατον διακωλύειν οὐδέν.

Footnote 47:

Plato Charm. 163 B-D on Hesiod.

Footnote 48:

Xen. Mem. ii. 1. 21-34, the story of Heracles (28).

Footnote 49:

Pseudo-Platon. Eryxias 397 D-E, discussed infra.

Footnote 50:

Hippias Minor 368 D, where he is presented as the jack of all trades. Cf. infra for the antithetic attitude of Plato.

Footnote 51:

Orestes 917-22; Supplices 399-456, 238-45; Phoenissae 535-51 (Dindorf), cited by Dümmler, Proleg. zu Platons Staat (1891), to show that there are traces of a political treatise of the school of Antiphon in Euripides. Cf. Barker, op. cit., p. 25 and note.

Footnote 52:

Orestes 917 ff.; cf. also the noble character of the peasant (αὐτουργός) in the Electra, who is a noble soul (252 f.), and who speaks the prologue, though he is only a secondary person in the play. Cf. also 367-82.

Footnote 53:

Fr. 345 (Nauck), the unjust man is ignoble (δυσγενής), though better born than Zeus; frs. 54 (Alex.), 514 (Melanippe), 8 (Electra); cf. n. 1 above, and infra. He puts worthy sentiments into the mouths of slaves and dresses his nobles in rags.

Footnote 54:

Ion 854; ἐν γάρ τι τοῦς δούλοισιν αἰσχύνην φέρει || τὀύνομα; frs. 828 (Phrixus), 515 (Melanippe) (Nauck); Helena 730; cf. Decharme, Euripide et l’esprit de son théâtre, pp. 162 ff.

Footnote 55:

His finest portrayals are noble women. He was no woman-hater, but freely presented both sides of female character. Cf. Medea 230 ff. and other such passages complaining of woman’s lot; fr. 655 (Protes.), advocating community of wives. Cf., however, Decharme, op. cit., 133 ff.

Footnote 56:

Cf. Nauck, frs. 642 (Polyidus), 55, 56 (Alex.), 95 (Alcmene), 143 (Andromeda), 326 and 328 (Danae); cf. Decharme, op. cit., pp. 163 ff. and notes; Dobbs, op. cit., p. 78, n. 5.

Footnote 57:

Op. cit., p. 7: “Ich auch in volkswirtschaftlicher Beziehung von keinen Neuern mehr als von ihm gelernt habe.” Cf. Kautz, op. cit., pp. 123 ff.

Footnote 58:

Thuc. ii. 40. 1; i. 70. 8; ii. 40. 2; etc.

Footnote 59:

Thuc. i. 2.

Footnote 60:

Thucydides Mythhistoricus (1907); cf. Shorey’s critical review, Dial, July-December, 1907, pp. 202 ff.; also W. Lamb, Clio Enthroned (1914), especially pp. 34-67. Lamb’s citations of Thucydides (pp. 35 f.), present sufficient evidence of the Greek historian’s economic insight.

Footnote 61:

Op. cit., pp. 18 f.

Footnote 62:

“Die wirtschaftliche Entwickelung des Alterthums,” Kleine Schriften, 1910; cf. also Beloch, Zeitschr. f. Socialwiss., II, 21 ff.; “Griechische Geschichte,” ibid.; Poehlmann, Geschichte des antiken Socialismus und Kommunismus, I (2d ed., 1912, Geschichte der sozialen Frage und des Socialismus in der antiken Welt). Citations from Poehlmann throughout the book are to this work unless otherwise specified. He exaggerates the development of capitalism. Meyer and Beloch are also somewhat misleading in their use of the modern terms for Greek conditions. Francotte (L’Industrie dans la Grèce ancienne ) is more conservative. For the older extreme conservative view, cf. the works of Rodbertus and Bücher. Cf. infra for further notice of the subject.

Footnote 63:

Haney, op. cit., p. 17.

Footnote 64:

For a full discussion of the Greek attitude toward labor, with citations from ancient and modern authors, cf. infra, p. 29, n. 4; pp. 32 ff., and notes; pp. 47 ff. and notes; pp. 69 f. and notes; pp. 93 ff. and notes.

Footnote 65:

Pol. i. 8. 1256b2.

Footnote 66:

Haney, op. cit., p. 17.

Footnote 67:

Emphasized by Poehlmann, op. cit., I, 593 f. Our citations will always be from the second edition, 1912.